Proposition Xxi.
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Proclus and Taylor, Thomas
PROPOSITION XXI.
That intellect is not the first cause.
Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.
For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all co-ordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principle.[219] In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole.
For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series, must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.
COROLLARY.
From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual monad; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates from the one which is prior to all things; and that there is an extension of these unities to the one. Hence, after the first one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects; after the first soul there are souls; and after total nature, there are natures.