The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body; just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

For body, so far as body, is alone divisible, and through this becomes passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since body, so far as body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when they are inherent in bodies, participate of passions, being divided together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though according to their own essence they are impartible.