On Providence and Fate, and That Which Is in Our Power
Project Gutenberg EPUB edition
Proclus and Taylor, Thomas
46. Again, therefore, you inquire what that which is in our power is. Which it was requisite to investigate in the beginning of the discussion. And afterwards you doubt concerning it. But inquiring about it, you define it to be that which is of itself uncircumscribed,[375] and self-energetic. If, however, this be the case, it is entirely incorruptible, and most powerful, and alone pertains to the ruler of all beings, but is not adapted to that which is in our power. I, therefore, consider this definition to be very remote from that conception of what is in our power, which the ancients adopting, attributed this to human souls. But do you also consider the truth of what I say. For they assumed that which is in our power as indicative of the energy of choice, making us to be the lords of choice and aversion, and as indicative of the choice of some good, or the contrary. For they did not consider choice and will to be the same; but they asserted that the latter pertains to good alone, but the former both to good and evil; just as false opinion pertains to that which is not good. Hence also, they said that election or choice characterizes the soul, which extends itself both to what is good, and what is not good, and that this pertains to the middle nature of that being which is converted to both these. This also common rumour testifies. For we praise the choice of these, but blame the choice of those. Evil, however, is not wished for by any one. And evil indeed appears to be good to those that choose it; for no soul knowing a thing to be evil would choose, but would avoid it.
On account of ignorance, however, the soul is busily employed about it; for she naturally possesses an acute love of good, but sometimes is powerless with respect to the attainment of it.
47. The soul, therefore, essentially possessing an inclination to both, viz. to good and evil, the ancients called this power of her elective, on account of which we are naturally adapted to choose one thing instead of another. And indeed, you may obtain from division such a definition of this power. Because all power is either rational or irrational, it is necessary that choice should be in one of these. But since it is not irrational; for we all say that the irrational power is without choice, it will be a certain rational power. But every rational as well as every irrational power, is either gnostic or appetitive. Choice, however, being election and desire, will be a certain appetite. But every appetite either alone looks to that which is real good, or to that which is only apparent good, or to both these. We say, however, that choice does not look to real good alone; for if it did, it would never be justly blamed; nor to apparent good alone; for in this case, it would not frequently be praised. Hence such a power is naturally adapted to look to both these.
48. Election, therefore, is in short, a rational power, desirous both of true and apparent good, leading the soul to both, on account of which she ascends and descends, errs, and acts with rectitude. The ancients perceiving the energy of this power, called the inclination of it both to real and apparent good, a twofold path in our nature. Hence the elective and that which is in our power, will be the same thing. And according to this power, we differ from divine, and from mortal natures; for each of these is unreceptive of this twofold inclination; since the former, indeed, on account of their transcendent excellence are alone established in true good; but the latter on account of defect, in apparent good. For intellect indeed characterizes the former, but sense the latter. And the former is our king, but the latter our messenger. We, however, being of a middle nature are established in choice; and are capable of being moved both to true and apparent good. But wherever we move, we are on all sides comprehended by wholes, from which we are allotted what is, according to desert. And if indeed we tend to that which is better, we thus tend as intellect; but if to that which is subordinate, as sense. That which is in our power, therefore, is not capable of effecting all things. For that which can effect all things is a power characterized by unity, and on this account can effect all things, because it is one and boniform.
But the power which is elective is dyadic, and on this account cannot accomplish all things; because by its twofold inclinations, it falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however, be itself effective of all things, if it had not an elective impulse; for then it would be will alone. For a life characterized by will subsists according to good, which causes that which is in our power to be most powerful, and is truly deiform, on account of which the soul also becomes a God, and as Plato says, governs the whole world.
49. Hence that which is in our power, neither pertains to the first, nor to the last of things, but to the medium between both. You, however, as it seems, have conceived it to be a power ruling over all things, leading all things according to its own impulse, and obtaining every thing which it desires; for you do not define it to be a power over the objects of desire within the soul, and which cause the electing soul to be such as it is; but you ascribe to it a power over things which are not in its power. For things external to the soul are not in our power; on which account also our life is mingled from things which are not, and from things which are in our power. And with worthy men, indeed, there is much of that which is in our power; for they use all things, modifying even those that are out of our power on account of virtue, and always adorning the present circumstance. But with the multitude, there is more of that which is not in our power; for they follow things external to themselves, not possessing a life within, which is able to assimilate them to themselves. Hence worthy men, indeed, are said to be free, and are so on account of the energy both of that which is in, and of that which is not in their power. But the multitude are called into servile necessity, in consequence of burying those things which are in their power, with those that are not, and possessing all things not in themselves.
50. After all this, you have added the colophon (or summit) of the doubts, by asking whether divinity knows or does not know events which are future to us. And if, indeed, he does not know them, you will say that he does not at all differ from us, who have no knowledge of futurity. But if he does know them, that which he knows will entirely and from necessity come to pass. This, however, as it would seem, not only destroys that which is in our power, but likewise every thing which is said to be contingent. This also, is usually said by those who conceive all things to exist by compulsion, and as I may say, has been asserted a thousand times. But they all reason as follows: if divinity knows every future event, that which is future will be from necessity. And they indeed assert it to be false that divinity knows every thing definitely; but they say that his knowledge is indefinite of things which indefinitely come to pass, in order that they may save what is contingent. Others, however, attributing a definite knowledge to divinity, admit necessity in every thing which comes to pass. These are the dogmas of the Peripatetic and Stoic sects. But Plato, and whoever is a friend to Plato, affirm that divinity definitely knows future events, and that nevertheless[376] some things are produced definitely, and others indefinitely, according to their respective natures. For those things which in effects subsist with division and contrarily, are antecedently comprehended in the Gods according to a more excellent condition only.
51. I say, for instance, the causes of generated natures, whether they are incorporeal or corporeal, subsist incorporeally with the Gods; and in a similar manner their knowledge is incorporeal. And again, the causes of intellectual, and of non-intellectual beings, subsist with the Gods both essentially, and according to science. For they also know things which are not intellectual intellectually. And again, of things which are produced by them, that are either temporal or without time, there is with them a cause and a knowledge exempt from time. Hence because of effects some are definite, but others indefinite, the Gods antecedently assume the knowledge of both these according to the more excellent mode, viz. according to the definite. Moreover, the form of knowledge is not such as the object of knowledge, but such as the gnostic nature. For knowledge is not in that which is known, but in that which knows. Hence, it is similar and of the like form to that in which it is, and not to that in which it is not. If, therefore, that which is known is indefinite, but that which knows it is definite, the knowledge is not also indefinite on account of the thing known, but definite on account of that which knows. For it is possible to know that which is subordinate after a more excellent mode, and that which is supreme after an inferior mode.
52. Hence, because the Gods are better than all things, they antecedently comprehend all things after a more excellent mode. And beings indeed, they comprehend superessentially;[377] things which are according to time, as we have already said, prior to time; corporeal natures, incorporeally; material natures immaterially; definitely, things indefinite; permanently, things unstable; and ingenerably, things generable. It does not, therefore, follow that if they know what will be, the event must happen from necessity; but to the event indeed we must give an indefinite generation from a definite cause, and to the Gods a definite foreknowledge of that which is indefinite. For neither does it follow that because your art[378] employs drums and wheels, and corporeal materials, these subsisted corporeally in your foreknowledge; but your imagination comprehended in itself incorporeally and vitally the productive principle of the future machine; and the astrolabe was corporeally fashioned from an internal knowledge which is not corporeal. If this, however, is the case in your art, what ought you to say of the foreknowledge of the Gods, in which all things subsist in a manner truly ineffable, and not to be circumscribed by us? Is it not evident, that this mode of comprehension is different from, and in no respect allied to the things which are produced by it? Hence the Gods know divinely, and in a way unaccompanied by time those things which are in our power, and we energize, as we are naturally adapted.
Whatever we choose also, is foreknown by them, not on account of the boundary which is in us, but on account of the boundary which is with them.
Such, my friend, is my answer to your inquiries, independent of which I am able to show you that there is something in our power, from praise and blame, from counsel, from exhortation and dehortation, from judicial affairs, from accusation and defence, from all political erudition, from legislation, from prayer, from sacerdotal methods, and from philosophy itself. For you well know that my preceptor [Syrianus,] used frequently to say, that if that which is in our power were destroyed, philosophy would be superfluous. For what should it instruct, when there is nothing which can be instructed, when there is nothing in us by which we may become better? Reconsidering, therefore, these things again and again, if you still have any doubts, do not be averse to write to me. For what subjects can we more aptly discuss than those, in the disquisition of which no one will accuse us of nugacity?