The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either the good, or that which is more excellent than the good. But if it is more excellent than the good, whether is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite that something should be present from cause to things caused,[210] and especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by the good, there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above the good, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.[211] But what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence, if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to the good. If, likewise, all beings aspire after the good, how is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to the good, how can they especially aspire after the good?

But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence, if it is the good from which all beings are suspended, the good is the principle and first cause of all things.