Moral theology

789. Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not accept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be condemned” (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).

(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite opinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative infidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination and Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that belief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a precept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those who say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means for justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that regularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is allowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation of the Gospel in many regions).

790. Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by which one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which one knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a more profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on account of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but substantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be saved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about the four great mysteries:

(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will take us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one understand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the definition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of beatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.

(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three divine Persons—the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct and equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction between nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions and properties.

(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for us, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to heaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in Christ there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of the Word.

791. Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it is not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge of the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death, it is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in substantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person must first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about the Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it is probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a necessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).

792. Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of receiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries are an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to one who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries above mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be. Absolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably valid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration, and as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be distinguished:

(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is in substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a person should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief instruction then and there, if there is time.

(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial ignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid, since the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a necessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the principles of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While ignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his confessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.

793. In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or absolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to receive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is substantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace and glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is substantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own fault, and is unwilling to hear about them.

(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is needed and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: “Let us say the act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, who has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love Him, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being received into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became man and died for my salvation.” This or a similar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present in baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate danger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short instruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty of receiving fuller instruction later on.

795. Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect to the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human nature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and is meritorious: “By faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises” (Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of faith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of God in giving one’s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent of credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only the part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact that a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the doctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which one assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments, such as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are miracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of those who delivered the revelation, etc.

(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human arguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths that can be established by natural reason (such as the existence of God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who demonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge, not belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if, while knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the authority of revelation.

(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments for the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation that are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation), provided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for the confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as he is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is a sign, not of little, but of great faith. “Be ready always,” says St. Peter (I Peter, iii. 15), “to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you.” And St. Anselm says: “It appears to me a sign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not take pains to understand what we believe.” St. Thomas writes: “When a man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith, but is a sign of greater merit.”

(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the formal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for then one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the word of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to support it.

The attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural reason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: “He that is a searcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory” (Prov., xxv. 27); “Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability” (Ecclus., iii. 22); “Faith loses its merit, if it is put to the test of reason” (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).

796. Besides the internal act of acceptance of revealed truth, faith has also external acts. (a) It commands the external acts of the other virtues, that is, acts directed to the specific ends of those virtues. Hence, one who fasts exercises an external act of the virtue of temperance, but it is his faith in the virtue that commands the fast. (b) Faith elicits the external act of profession of faith as its own proper external act directed to its own specific end: “I believed, for which cause I have spoken” (Ps. cxv. 10; II Cor., iv. 13). External profession of faith, therefore, is not an act proceeding from faith; it is an act of faith. The necessity of this act will be considered below in the article about the commandments of faith.

797. The Habit of Faith.—Faith is not only an act that passes, but it is also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the “most great and perfect promises” which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3 sqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just like hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things sweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures internal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the ends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to a supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along with grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).

798. The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican: “Faith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God’s grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural reason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.”

(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no intrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed see God, for “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he knows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is about truths that surpass reason—things “that appear not.” This, of course, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light added to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance of faith are not evidently credible.

(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in which one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and the truth of His revelation. “Jesus said to her (Martha): I am the resurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him: Yea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.” (John, xi. 25-27).

800. Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act performed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the infusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But there are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and hence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii. 26).

(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This latter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives meritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join to belief a life in agreement with belief—that is, the state of grace, love of God and good works.

(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true virtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper end; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed to the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who believe, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of importance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead faith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect attendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.

(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in Paradise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of the beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in the friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the friendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith (see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.

802. Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have vision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ while on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately even one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above the authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of faith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the lost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue infused by God. “The devils believe and tremble” (James, ii. 19), but their belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.

803. Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith. Thus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv. 31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv. 28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to accept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?

(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the formal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other motive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence than any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the exclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not be supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect should feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural truth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion and confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more vehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect the faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another, according as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his acceptance of God’s Word than another.