Moral theology

482. Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only with single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment of the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he fulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly, though not entirely, distracted at Mass, obeys the church law of assistance at Mass on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he worship God devoutly);

(a) Authentic interpretation given in the form of law has the force of law; if it is merely declarative of words of the law certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and is retroactive; if it is supplementary, it needs promulgation and is not retroactive, since it is a new law (Canon 17, Sec. 2);

(d) Doctrinal interpretation has not the force of law, since it does not proceed from the lawgiver. Its value depends on the reasons and the authority by which it is supported. When all the doctors agree, their interpretation is morally certain; when they disagree, the various interpretations have more or less probability.

485. Rules for Doctrinal Interpretation.—(a) The words must be understood in their proper sense according to text and context, unless this be impossible; if doubtful, they must be judged according to parallel places in the Code, the circumstances, reason of the law, and the mind of the lawgiver (Canon 18).

(b) Things that are burdensome should be understood in their most restricted sense (Canon 19), things that are favorable in their widest sense. Thus, the censure pronounced against simony is understood in the narrow sense of simony against the divine law; a privilege granted to the clergy is understood in the wide sense as given to all the clergy.

(d) A particular law derogates from a general law; but a general law does not derogate from a previous particular law, unless derogation is expressly mentioned in the general law; for the particular law is considered an exception to the general law (Canon 22).

486. Authentic interpretations of ecclesiastical laws are given by the legislator, his successor, or one delegated by either (Canon 17, Sec. 1). (a) The Pope is the authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws. A special commission appointed by the Pope interprets the general law of the Code. (b) The bishop is the authentic interpreter of diocesan laws made by himself or by his predecessors.

487. Cessation of Obligation.—The ordinary ways in which a law ceases to be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject, that he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to observe it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes the obligation for the individual (dispensation).

488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to be subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of exemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in force), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty of any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law became effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law does not oblige that one remain subject to it.

490. Ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of a penalty attached to the law has the following effects determined in the law: (a) No kind of ignorance excuses from irritating or inhabilitating laws, unless the contrary is expressly provided for in the law itself (Canon 16, Sec. 1). Thus a person who contracts marriage, while ignorant that he and the other person are first cousins, is invalidly married.

(c) If the law contains the following words: _praesumpserit, ausus fuerit, scienter, studiose, temerarie, consulto egerit_, or others similar to them which require full knowledge and deliberation, any diminution of imputability on the part of either the intellect or the will exempts the delinquent from penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.2). (d) If the law does not contain such words, crass or supine ignorance of the law or even of only the penalty does not exempt from any penalty _latae sententiae_; ignorance that is not crass or supine exempts from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.3, 1).

491. Other specific determinations of the law include: (a) Inculpable ignorance of the law itself excludes moral imputability (Canon 2202, Sec.1); actual inculpable inadvertence or error in regard to the law has the same effect (Canon 2202, Sec.3). (b) Culpable ignorance, or culpable inadvertence, or error concerning the law or concerning the fact diminish imputability more or less in proportion to the culpability of the ignorance (Canon 2202, Sec.1). (c) If the ignorance, even inculpable, affects only the fact of the existence of the penalty, it does not exclude imputability of the delict, but it does diminish it (Canon 2202, Sec.2).

492. Absolute or physical impossibility (i.e., the want of the power or of the means of complying with a law), of course, excuses from its observance; for no one is bound to what is impossible. This applies to divine law, and hence much more to human law. Example: He who is unable to leave the house is not obliged to go to Mass.

493. Moral impossibility—that is, the inability to comply with the law without extraordinary labor, or the imminent danger of losing a notable good or of incurring a great evil—does not excuse from the observance of ecclesiastical law when this law receives through circumstances the added force of the negative law of nature. This happens when the evil that will result through the observance of the law bears no proportion to the evil that will result from its violation, the former being private or temporal or human, the latter public or spiritual or divine; for the law of nature forbids that the common welfare, or the salvation of a soul, or the honor of God be sacrificed for the benefit of an individual, or for the life of the body, or for the welfare of a creature. Example: The command to abstain from meat on Friday obliges, if one has been ordered to violate it as a sign of contempt of God or of religion, even though death is threatened for refusal.

(a) One is excused when a considerable loss in health, reputation, spiritual advantage, property, etc., or a grave inconvenience will result from observing a law which is not a prohibition of nature in the sense of the previous paragraph; for the legislator cannot impose obligations that are needlessly heavy, and hence positive law does not oblige in case of such moral impossibility. Example: Our Lord reproved the inhuman rigor of the Pharisees, who insisted that their regulations must be observed, whatever the difficulty or cost.

(b) One is excused when a lower or less urgent law is in conflict with a law that is higher or more urgent. In such a case the greater obligation prevails, and the lesser obligation disappears. Examples: The divine laws that one must preserve one’s life or administer Baptism to a dying person prevail over the human law of attendance at church. The less urgent law of fasting yields to the more urgent law of devoting oneself to duties required by one’s state of life, if there is a conflict between the two laws.

495. The loss, evil or inconvenience that constitutes moral impossibility with respect to a law, must bear a proportion to the law itself; and hence the higher or the more imperative the law, the greater must be the reason that suffices to excuse from it.

496. Only a learned and prudent man can determine whether moral impossibility exists with reference to a particular case, and hence it would be dangerous for those who are not theologians to decide, either for themselves or for others. The points that have to be considered in judging are: (a) whether or not the difficulty is of a gravity proportionate to the importance of the law (e.g., a graver reason is required to excuse from a law that obliges under mortal sin than to excuse from a law that binds under light sin); (b) whether or not the difficulty is grave in relation to the person concerned (e.g., an obligation that is easy for a healthy person may be very difficult for one who is infirm).

498. It is lawful to cause impossibility of observing a law, if there be some sufficient reason for doing this; for it is lawful to do something from which two effects, one good and the other bad, result, if the good effect is the one intended, and there is a sufficient reason for permitting the evil effect (102 sqq.). Example: It is sometimes lawful to do some extra work that is very useful, even if the labor makes one unable to observe a fast.

499. The sufficient reason spoken of in the last paragraph is one that is proportionate to the urgency and importance of the command and to the frequency of the non-observance. Examples: A greater reason is required to take up some work which will make it impossible to keep the fast, if this be done on the fast day itself, than if it be done the day before. A far greater reason is required to take up some work that makes the observance of the fast impossible, if this happens frequently or habitually, than if it happens only once or twice.

(a) It ceases from without (i.e., from the act of the legislator), when he abolishes it, by total or partial revocation (abrogation, derogation), or by the institution of a new law directly contrary to it (obrogation). In the new Code of Canon Law there are many instances of revocation or obrogation of older legislation (see Canons 22, 23), as in the matter of censures and matrimonial impediments. Examples: In the diocese of X a minor feast was made a holyday of obligation. This law was abrogated, if later on it was decreed that neither the prohibition against servile works nor the precept of hearing Mass was obligatory for that feast; it was derogated from, if later it was decreed that servile works were permitted, but Mass was obligatory for that day; it was obrogated, if a later law included the minor feast in a list of special days of devotion for which the hearing of Mass was recommended.

(a) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been a benefit, it has become a detriment, inasmuch as its observance now would be wicked, or impossible, or too burdensome. In this case the law ceases, since it is now contrary to the supreme law that the common welfare be promoted. Example: A particular law forbade the use of fat or grease in the preparation of food on days of abstinence. Later, it became impossible to procure the substitutes previously used.

(b) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been useful, it has become useless, inasmuch as it is no longer necessary for the end intended by the lawgiver. In this case the law ceases, for regulations should not be imposed needlessly. Example: The Council of Jerusalem made a law that the faithful should abstain from using as food animals that had been strangled (Acts, xv. 20). The purpose of the law was to avoid offense to the Jewish converts, who at that time formed a large part of the Christian community and who had a religious abhorrence for such food. But shortly afterwards, the Gentile element having become stronger in the Church, no attention was paid to ceremonial rules of Judaism.

(a) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the purpose of the lawgiver generally and permanently, if the changed conditions affect the whole community or the great majority, and are lasting. In this case the law ceases; for, since it is made for the community as a whole and as a lasting ordinance, it cannot endure, if it becomes permanently unserviceable to the community. Examples are given in the previous paragraph.