Phædo; Or, The Immortality Of The Soul.
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Plato and Cary, Henry
"Do you not know, then, that lovers when they see a lyre, or a garment, or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use, are thus affected; they both recognize the lyre, and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one, seeing Simmias, is often reminded of Cebes, and so in an infinite number of similar instances."
"An infinite number, indeed, by Jupiter!" said Simmias.
"Is not, then," he said, "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence, especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which, from lapse of time, and not thinking of them, one has now forgotten?"
"Certainly," he replied.
50. "But what?" he continued. "Does it happen that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man, and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?"
"Certainly."
"And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?"
"It does, indeed," he replied.
"Does it not happen, then, according to all this, that reminiscence arises partly from things like, and partly from things unlike?"
"It does."
"But when one is reminded by things like, is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected, so as to perceive whether, as regards likeness, this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?"
"It is necessary," he replied.
"Consider, then," said Socrates, "if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another, nor one stone with another, nor any thing else of this kind, but something altogether different from all these—abstract equality; do we allow that there is any such thing, or not?"
"By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it," replied Simmias.
51. "And do we know what it is itself?"
"Certainly," he replied.
"Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned, and that from seeing logs, or stones, or other things of the kind, equal, we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these—for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus. Do not stones that are equal, and logs sometimes that are the same, appear at one time equal, and at another not?"
"Certainly."
"But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?"
"Never, Socrates, at any time."
"These equal things, then," he said, "and abstract equality, are not the same?"
"By no means, Socrates, as it appears."
"However, from these equal things," he said, "which are different from that abstract equality, have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?"
"You speak most truly," he replied.
"Is it not, therefore, from its being like or unlike them?"
"Certainly."
"But it makes no difference," he said. "When, therefore, on seeing one thing, you form, from the sight of it, the notion of another, whether like or unlike, this," he said, "must necessarily be reminiscence."
"Certainly."
52. "What, then, as to this?" he continued. "Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is, or do they fall short in some degree, or not at all, of being such as equality itself is?"
"They fall far short," he replied.
"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that is, but is inferior to it—do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?"
"It is necessary."
"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"
"Assuredly."
"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
"Such is the case."
53. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
"Even so."