Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4 In Chronological Order,...

1. To what part of our nature do pleasure and grief, fear and boldness desire and aversion, and, last, pain, belong? Is it to the soul (herself),271 or to the soul when she uses the body as an instrument,272 or to some third (combination) of both? Even the latter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either the simple mixture of the soul and the body,273 or some different product resulting therefrom.274 The same uncertainty obtains about the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely, passions,275 actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether ratiocination276 and opinion both, belong to the same principle as the passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the other would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire concerning the nature and classification of thought.277 Last we should study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes to some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who feels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of feeling, or at least they do not exist without it.278