PARMENIDES
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Plato and Jowett, Benjamin
Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other.
How is that?
Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal.
True.
And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which is greater?
Yes.
And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater.
Certainly.
But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?
Impossible.
And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?
It appears so.
But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures.
Right.
And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.
It has.
Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or less than itself, or other?
Certainly.
Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?
Why not?
Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?
We did say so.
And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.
Very true.
How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?
In no way.
Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?
Clearly not.
Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?
Certainly.
And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?
True.
Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.
What do you mean?
I mean this:—A thing does not need to become different from another thing which is already different; it IS different, and if its different has become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a different—the only different possible is one which is becoming.
That is inevitable.
But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to nothing else.
True.
Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?
Yes.