BOOK IV
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Xenophon and Dakyns, Henry Graham
Euth. That would be all fair and right also.
Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?
Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.
Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?
Euth. Apparently.
Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition—that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible. (29)
(29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."
I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud? (30)
(30) Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.
On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).
Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?
Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.
Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself—accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?
Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.
Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement. (31)
(31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
Soc. Allow you! Of course you may—anything rather than make a false entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful—to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?
Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.
(32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy."
Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)
(33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}—a doctrine and a knowledge of the Just.
Euth. That is my opinion.
Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)—he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
(34) Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."
Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.
Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate? (35)
(35) Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"
Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.
Soc. And which of the two knows what is right—he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)
(36) Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously? Euth. Clearly he does.
Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.
Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge? (37)
(37) Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the {episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such {episteme}? Euth. Yes. Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp. min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?
Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail of my own admission. (38)
(38) Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also, heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).
Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that, now more, now less—what do you think of such a man?