Æsthetic as science of expression and general linguistic

Intuitive knowledge—Its independence with respect to intellectual knowledge—Intuition and perception—Intuition and the concepts of space and time—Intuition and sensation—Intuition and association—Intuition and representation—Intuition and expression—Illusion as to their difference—Identity of intuition and expression

Corollaries and explanations—Identity of art and intuitive knowledge—No specific difference—No difference of intensity—The difference is extensive and empirical—Artistic genius—Content and form in Æsthetic—Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the artistic illusion—Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling, not a theoretical fact—Æsthetic appearance, and feeling—Criticism of the theory of æsthetic senses—Unity and indivisibility of the work of art—Art as liberator

Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge—Criticism of the negations of this thesis—Art and science—Content and form: another meaning—Prose and poetry—The relation of first and second degree—Non-existence of other forms of cognition—Historicity—Its identity with and difference from art—Historical criticism—Historical scepticism—Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural sciences, and their limits—The phenomenon and the noumenon

Criticism of the probable and of naturalism—Criticism of ideas in art, of theses in art, and of the typical—Criticism of the symbol and of the allegory—Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary kinds—Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art—Empirical sense of the divisions of kinds

Criticism of the philosophy of History—Æsthetic intrusions into Logic—Logic in its essence—Distinction between logical and non-logical judgements—Syllogistic—Logical falsehood and æsthetic truth—Reformed logic—Note to the fourth Italian edition

The will—The will as an ulterior stage in respect to knowledge—Objections and explanations—Criticism of practical judgements or judgements of value—Exclusion of the practical from the æsthetic—Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice of content—Practical innocence of art—Independence of art—Criticism of the saying: the style is the man—Criticism of the concept of sincerity in art

The two forms of the practical activity—The economically useful—Distinction between the useful and the technical—Distinction of the useful from the egoistic—Economic will and moral will—Pure economicity—The economic side of morality—The merely economical and the error of the morally indifferent—Criticism of utilitarianism and the reform of Ethics and of Economics—Phenomenon and noumenon in practical activity

The characters of art—Non-existence of modes of expression—Impossibility of translations—Criticism of the rhetorical categories—Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories—Their use as synonyms of the æsthetic fact—Their use to indicate various æsthetic imperfections—Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the service of science—Rhetoric in the schools—The resemblances of expressions—The relative possibility of translations

Various significations of the word feeling—Feeling as activity —Identification of feeling with economic activity—Criticism of hedonism—Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity —Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings—Value and disvalue: the contraries and their union—The beautiful as the value of expression, or expression without qualification—The ugly, and the elements of beauty which compose it—Illusion that there exist expressions neither beautiful nor ugly—True æsthetic feelings and concomitant and accidental feelings—Criticism of apparent feelings

Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher senses—Criticism of the theory of play—Criticism of the theory of sexuality and of triumph—Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic: meaning in it of content and form—Æsthetic hedonism and moralism—The rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of art—Criticism of pure beauty