A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 1

The Concordia was silent as to the salaried officials, thus leaving them in possession of the active and passive fuero in both civil and criminal cases. It devoted itself wholly to the familiars who, in this as in so much else, were the leading source of trouble. After regulating, as we shall see hereafter, their number and character, it defined that in civil cases they should be subject wholly to the secular courts. For the greater crimes, moreover, cognizance was also reserved exclusively to the courts, the list comprising treason, unnatural crime, sedition, violating royal safe-conducts, disobedience to royal mandates, treachery, rape, carrying off women, highway robbery, arson, house-breaking and crimes of greater magnitude than these, as well as resistance or formal disrespect to the royal courts. Those who held office were also amenable to the courts for official malfeasance. This left only petty offences subject to inquisitorial jurisdiction and for these familiars were liable to arrest by secular magistrates, subject to being immediately transferred to the Inquisition. For doubtful cases it was provided that, when the lay judge and inquisitor could not agree, there should be no contention, but the evidence was to be sent to the court of the king, where two members each of the Suprema and Council of Castile should decide as to the jurisdiction; for this a majority was required and, in case of equal division of votes, the matter went to the king for final decision.

No appeal from this was allowed and meanwhile the accused was retained in the prison to which he had been consigned at arrest.[1072] This process of adjudicating disputes became known as competencia, the details of which will be considered hereafter.

Whatever concession the Inquisition made in thus surrendering a portion of its jurisdiction over familiars was more than compensated by what was evidently part of the agreement, the issue on the same day of Philip’s cédula addressed to all judicial bodies forbidding them to entertain appeals of any kind from the acts of the Holy Office (p. 341). It thus secured complete autonomy; it was rendered self-judging, responsible to the king alone, and the populations were surrendered wholly to its discretion.

As far as regards Castile, the Concordia of 1553 was final. It is true that the royal cédula of Aranjuez, April 28, 1583, extended its principles to the salaried officials, but there is no trace of the observance of this.[1073] Another point was subjected to a temporary modification. The absolute denial of justice in allowing inquisitors to have their civil suits decided by their own tribunals attracted attention, after nearly a century, and the Suprema, February 18, 1641, ordered that these cases should be referred to it, when, if it deemed proper, it would commission the tribunal to hear them, but this slender restriction seems to have elicited so active an opposition that it was withdrawn within three months by a counter order of May 14th, restoring to the inquisitors the power of sitting in judgement on their own cases.[1074] It is easy to conceive the amount of oppression and wrong which they could thus inflict.

With these trivial exceptions the Concordia remained the law in Castile. In 1568 Philip II issued a cédula stating that it had not been observed, wherefore he ordered strict compliance with it and, as late as 1775 Carlos III treats it as being still in force and to be respected by all parties.[1075] If Philip, however, expected peace between the rival and jealous jurisdictions, as the result of the Concordia, he deceived himself. Both were eager for quarrel and opportunities to gratify combative instincts were not lacking. The secular courts resented the intrusion of the Inquisition, which was careful to keep antagonism active by the insulting arrogance of its methods, whenever a question arose between them. There was ample field for contention, for not only were the excepted crimes loosely defined, giving rise to many nice questions, but the Inquisition acutely argued that before the royal courts could assume possession of a case the crime must be fully proved, for the familiar was entitled to the fuero until his guilt was ascertained, thus keeping in its own hands all the vital parts of the process and excluding the secular justices.[1076] Then the circle of excepted cases was enlarged, not only for familiars but for salaried officials, by various edicts from time to time, as we have seen with regard to pistols and discharging fire-arms.

Another instance was a cédula of Philip II, in 1566, including among exceptions the violation of royal pragmáticas, which was put to the test, in 1594, when the Chancellery of Granada prosecuted a notary of the tribunal for wearing a larger ruff than was allowed by a sumptuary pragmática; the tribunal excommunicated the judges but, when the case was carried up to the Suprema and Council of Castile, the Chancellery was justified.[1077] In the frenzied efforts to maintain the value of the worthless vellon coinage, Philip IV, by repeated edicts between 1631 and 1660, deprived familiars and salaried officials of the fuero in cases of demanding more than the legal premium for the precious metals or of counterfeiting or importing base money.[1078] Frauds on the revenue from tobacco also deprived all offenders of exemptions, by a pragmática of 1719, but it was difficult to enforce and had to be repeated in 1743, after which at last Inquisitor-general Prado y Cuesta, in 1747, ordered the tribunals to obey it.[1079]

Although Navarre was under the crown of Castile, the Concordia of 1553 was not extended to it until 1665, by a royal cédula of May 9th. The questions which agitated the rest of Spain seem to have rarely presented themselves there, for we hear little of them in that quarter, although, in 1564, the tribunal of Logroño complained of the intrusion of the secular courts on its jurisdiction and there were, as we shall see hereafter, occasional collisions on the subject of witchcraft, which was mixti fori.[1080]

The kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon were the scenes of much greater trouble than those of Castile, in delimiting the boundaries of the rival jurisdictions, for they still had institutions which could remonstrate against abuses and struggle for their removal. We have seen how recalcitrant they were when the Inquisition was introduced and how vigorously they struggled against the abuses which followed. In the Concordias of 1512 and 1520 they secured certain paper guarantees, but these were brushed aside by the Inquisition with customary ill-faith. Irritation and hostility became chronic, with the result that they were denied some of the slender alleviations vouchsafed to Castile, on the ground that the character of the population and the neighborhood of the heretics of France rendered it necessary that the Holy Office should be fortified with greater privileges than in the rest of Spain.

Of the three kingdoms Valencia was the one which gave the least trouble in this matter. Yet a case occurring in 1540 is highly significant of the terrorism under which the royal judges discharged their duties. Dr. Ferrer of Tortosa, one of the judges, appealed to Inquisitor-general Tavera, representing that in the previous year he had condemned to death a murderer, who had fully deserved it. Now that the inquisitor had come his enemies represent that the culprit was a familiar, although he had never claimed to be one, and it is currently reported that the inquisitor is about to prosecute him (Ferrer). If he is in fault in the matter he will cheerfully submit to punishment, but he begs not to be subjected to the infamy of a trial. To this appeal the Suprema responded by ordering the inquisitor to send it such evidence as he may gather and to await a reply before taking action.[1081] It is evident that all criminal judges lived in an atmosphere of dread lest at any moment the honest discharge of their functions might precipitate them into a disastrous conflict with the tribunal. It justifies the complaints of the Córtes of 1547 and 1553, the latter of which declared that the inquisitors exceeded their jurisdiction, intervening in many affairs, both civil and criminal, that had no connection with heresy. This caused great disturbance of justice and contentions between the jurisdictions, in which the tribunal assumed to be supreme and to define the limits of its own power.

Great as were these evils they were daily increasing and were becoming intolerable, wherefore the Córtes prayed that the subject be investigated and a clear definition be made between the royal jurisdiction and that of the Inquisition.[1082]

This resulted in a junta of the members of the Suprema and of the Council of Aragon, who agreed upon a Concordia, published by Prince Philip, May 11, 1554. In this he recited that, in consequence of the great numbers of familiars and their endeavoring to have all their cases, civil and criminal, tried by the tribunal, which sought to protect them in this against the claims of the royal judges, there had arisen many contentions in which the whole of the Audiencia had been excommunicated. To put an end to this unseemly strife he had caused the junta to be held, with the result of the following articles, which he ordered both sides to observe, the royal officials under pain of a thousand florins, and the inquisitors as they desired to please him and the emperor. In this the first point was the reduction of the excessive number of familiars; in the city of Valencia they were not to exceed one hundred and eighty; in towns of more than a thousand hearths there might be eight, in those of over five hundred six, in smaller places four, except that in the coast towns there might be two more. Lists of all appointees were to be furnished to the magistrates, both to check excess and to identify individuals. In civil suits they were to enjoy the passive fuero but not the active; if in contracts they renounced this privilege the condition held good, while, if the other party agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, he could not be cited before it.

In criminal cases, the Inquisition had sole cognizance with respect to officials, their servants and families and to familiars but not to their wives, children and servants. When contests arose with secular courts, mild measures were to be used and excommunication be avoided as far as possible. When a familiar entered into a treaty of peace and truce, it was to be executed before an inquisitor and, if it contained a condition of death for violation, the inquisitor, in case of such violation, was to relax the culprit to the secular arm to be put to death. Familiars who were in trade were not to enjoy the fuero for frauds or violations of municipal laws and officials holding public office were liable to the secular courts for malfeasance therein.[1083]

This would appear to grant to the Inquisition all that it had any excuse for asking, but it was impossible to bind the inquisitors to any compact, or to observe any rules. A letter to them from the Suprema, in September, 1560, reminds them that it had already ordered them, in the case of Juan Sánchez, to deprive him of his familiarship, to withdraw their inhibitions and censures, and to remit the affair to the secular judge, in spite of which they had gone forward and rendered sentence; now, as Sánchez is not a familiar, they must positively send the case back to the ordinary courts.[1084] When such persistence in injustice existed, it is not surprising that, at the Córtes of Monzon, in 1564, the deputies of Valencia, like those of Aragon and Catalonia, presented a series of complaints, bearing chiefly on abuses of jurisdiction. We happen to have a view of the situation by an impartial observer, the Venetian envoy, Giovanni Soranzo, in his relation of 1565, which is worth repeating, although we must bear in mind that it was impossible for a Venetian statesman to give Philip II credit for the honest fanaticism which underlay his character. After alluding to the privileges of the Aragonese kingdoms, he proceeds “The king uses every opportunity to deprive them of these great privileges and, knowing that there is no easier or more certain method than through the Inquisition, he is continually increasing its authority.

In these last Córtes the Aragonese prayed that the Inquisition should take cognizance of no cases save those of religion and said that they grieved greatly that it embraced infinite things as distant as possible from its jurisdiction and they presented many cases not pertaining in any way to its duties. In truth at present the Inquisition interposes in everything, without respect to any one of whatever rank or position, and we may say positively that this tribunal is the real master which rules and dominates all Spain. The king replied that the Inquisition was not to be discussed in the Córtes, when they all arose and threatened to depart without finishing any other business, if the king did not wish them to discuss a matter of so much importance to them. The king quieted them by promising that, when he returned to Castile, he would listen to their complaints and would not fail to grant the appropriate relief. But undoubtedly he did this so that the Córtes should end without a revolt, his intention being to increase rather than to diminish the importance of the Inquisition, clearly recognizing it as the means of maintaining his reputation and of keeping the people in obedience and terror.”[1085]

Soranzo’s account of the Córtes is not wholly complete. When Philip promised relief after his return to Castile, the deputies replied that they did not choose to be convoked in Castile and that they would go no further with the subsidio which he wanted until they were satisfied. The sessions were prolonged; the patience of the deputies outwore his own and he promised that he would have a visitation made of the tribunals of the three kingdoms and then, in concert with their Diputados, issue a new series of regulations.[1086] The promise was kept. Francisco de Soto Salazar, a member of the Suprema, was sent, in 1566, with full powers and instructions to investigate all abuses, but especially those connected with jurisdiction in matters not of faith. In Valencia his attention was particularly called to a practice of appointing deputy inquisitors and officials and investing them with the privilege of the fuero as well as mechanics employed on the palace of the Inquisition and houses of the officials and also to the overgrown number of familiars and their character.[1087] In Catalonia, especially, he found much to criticize, as we shall have occasion to see hereafter, for he performed his mission thoroughly and conscientiously; he listened to all complaints, investigated them and bore back to the Suprema full reports which bore hardly on the methods of all the tribunals. Prolonged debates ensued between the Suprema, the Council of Aragon and the Diputados and finally, in 1568, a new Concordia was issued.

It is significant that it no longer was a royal decree but bore the shape of instructions from Inquisitor-general Espinosa and the Suprema to the tribunals, and the king only appeared in it as communicating it to his representatives and ordering its observance under pain of a thousand florins, coupled with commands to favor and reverence the Inquisition and its officials, to give them all necessary aid and to protect and defend their privileges.

The Concordia thus granted to Valencia confirmed that of 1554 and ordered its observance, adding a number of special provisions, highly suggestive of the abuses which had flourished. As affording a view in some detail of the causes of popular irritation and of the remedies sought, I subjoin an abstract of the articles bearing on the subject.

Outside of cases of heresy inquisitors must not interfere with the execution of justice by the royal judges under pretext that culprits have committed offences pertaining to them, but in such cases the judges shall be notified and allowed to execute justice, after which the inquisitors can inflict punishment. In case of heresy, however, a prisoner can be demanded, to be returned after trial, provided he is not sentenced to relaxation.

Familiars are not to be protected in the violation of municipal regulations, nor, during pestilence, in the refusal to observe the regulations for the avoidance of contagion; they must submit for inspection the goods which they bring in and the royal judges shall not be prevented from imposing the penalties provided in the royal pragmática.