The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa, Volume 3...

1443. Karma-buddhi is to be taken as one. It means the consciousness or apprehension of functions. Each sense or organ instinctively knows what its object is and apprehends that object immediately. This apprehension of its own functions, which every sense possesses, is here designated as Karma-buddhi. Mana-shashththani here simply means 'mind completing the tale of six.' It has no reference to the five senses having the mind for the sixth, for the senses have already been named in the previous verses.

1449. What the speaker inculcates in verses 41 and 42 is this: some are of opinion that with the apparent destruction of the body, the attributes that make up the body do not cease to exist. It is true that they cease to become apprehensible by the senses; but then, though removed from the ken of the senses, their existence may be affirmed by inference. The argument is that, if destroyed, their reappearance would be impossible. The reappearance, however, is certain. (For rebirth is a doctrine that is believed to be a solemn truth requiring no argument to prove it). Hence, the attributes, when apparently destroyed, do continue to exist. They are regarded as then inhering in the linga or subtile body. The counter opinion is that, when destroyed, they are destroyed for ever. The latter opinion is condemned by the speaker.

1450. In the second line the word is Gadhamavidwansah, i.e., 'ignorant of its bottom or depth.' K.P. Singha gives the meaning correctly, without translating the verse literally. The Burdwan translator makes nonsense of it. Both however, wrongly take agadha as the final word in yathagadha, forgetting that agadham is a masculine adjective incapable of qualifying nadim which is feminine. Ayam is Jiva. The last clause is to be taken as buddhiyogam anuprachyuta ayam tatha.

1451. This is not a difficult verse, yet both the vernacular translators have misunderstood it. What is said in the first line is this: yat vahudosham karoti, yat (cha) purakritam, ekatah cha dushyati. Both the finite verbs have jnanin (the man of knowledge) for their nominative understood. Dushyati means nasyati or destroys. The meaning then is that the man of Knowledge destroys his sinful acts of both this and past lives. The commentator cites the well-known simile of the lotus leaf not being drenched or soaked with water even when dipped in water. Now, this is that unseen fruit of Knowledge. In the second line, the visible fruits are indicated. The man of Knowledge refrains from censuring the wicked acts of others and from perpetrating any wicked act himself. Yat cha dushyati means yat parakritam anishtam dushyati or nindati, yat karoti means yat swayam ragadi-doshat karoti; tadubhayam apriyam (sa) na karoti, the reason being dwaitadarsana-bhavah. Such a man truly regards the universe as identifiable with himself.

1454. I have understood that acts are for sorrow; that the fruits also of acts are for sorrow in spite of the apparent character of some; and that the fruits of acts are varied, sometimes other fruits appearing than those expected. Hence, I do not indulge in sorrow, for I avoid acts and do not grieve for not obtaining the fruits of acts or for the accession of fruits other than those apparently agreeable.

1456. Ignorance lies at the root of sorrow. By casting off ignorance, we have avoided sorrow. Hence, neither religion or religious acts such as Sacrifices, etc., can do us any good or harm. As regards happiness and misery again, these two cannot agitate us at all, since we know their value, both being ephemeral in comparison with the period for which we are to exist.

1457. Hence, no one should indulge in pride, saying, 'I am happy,' nor yield to sorrow, saying, 'I am miserable.' Both happiness and misery are transitory. The man of wisdom should never suffer himself to be agitated by these transitory states of his mind.

1460. The scriptures contain both kinds of instruction. There are declarations that are entirely in favour of Acts or observances. There are again declarations in favour of Knowledge. What the speaker asks is that the Rishi should discourse upon what the speaker should do, i.e., whether he should betake himself to the acquisition of Knowledge or to the doing of acts.

1461. i.e., Each Asrama speaks of particular observances and courses of conduct as beneficial. This, therefore, is a source of confusion to men of plain understandings. Is there no distinction then among duties or observances in respect of their beneficial character? This is the question propounded. The commentator thinks by the word asramas is meant the four principal faiths and not the modes of life.

1462. I retain the word asrama in the English version as it is very doubtful in what sense it has been used in the original. The commentator explains that by four asramas are meant the four principal forms of creed prevalent at one time in India. The first is that there is no such thing as virtue or righteousness. This is ascribed to Sakya Simha or Buddha. The second is that righteousness consists in only the worship of trees, etc. The third is that only is righteousness which the Vedas have laid down. The fourth is that transcending righteousness and its reverse there is something for whose attainment one should strive. Yatha samkalpitah is explained by the commentator as yo yena sreyastena bhavitastasya tadeva sreyah.

1463. Gunoddesam is Gunakirtanam or the announcement of merits. What Narada says here is this: the asramas are four. The merits of each have been proclaimed by their respective founders. The principal merit each claims is that it leads to knowledge of Self. Now, the announcement is nanarupam; it is also prithak; and lastly, it is viprasthitam or contradictory, for, as the commentator points out, that which a particular asrama announces to be righteous is according to another unrighteous. Both the vernacular translators give incorrect versions.

1467. Atiyoga and Ayoga are well-known words which have no chance of being misunderstood in the way in which they have been misunderstood by both the vernacular translators. Indeed, K.P. Singha blunders ridiculously, while the Burdwan translator limits them to only the use of food, supposing the commentator's concrete examples exhaust the meaning.

1470. Anuvishayam is vishayam anu vartate, i.e., rasah or flavour. An eater of vighasa is a good or pious man. What is said here is that such men eat for only filling their stomachs and not because eating is source of enjoyment or gratification. Atmavishayan is Buddherviseshatovandhakan, i.e., rasa-viseshan.

1472. Akasasthah is niralamvanah, i.e., men who have no foundations to stand upon. The Bombay text reads dosham, the Bengal texts, doshan; the sense remains unaltered. The Bombay reading is atmapujabhikama, while the Bengal reading is the same word in the plural form. I accept the singular form and take it as qualifying panditah.

1473. Some of the Bengal texts read khattam. The Bombay reading is khatwam. The commentator explains that khatwam samarudhah Tibra duhkha-grastah. Anusayi means purvakarmavasanavan. The sense seems to be this: the desires born of one's past acts, i.e., acts of previous lives, adhere to the mind. Nothing can wipe them off, save Nivritti and Tattwajnanam or knowledge of truth. One should, therefore, practise the religion of Nivritti and seek to acquire knowledge of Truth.

1476. Kamesah is possessor of all objects of desire or enjoyment. The sense is this: where the king, casting off desire, wins prosperity for himself; i.e., though possessed of wealth, is not attached to wealth. The expression may also mean 'master of desire,' i.e., where the king casts off desire and masters his desires without allowing the latter to master him.