PRELIMINARY REMARKS—HOMICIDE IN GENERAL
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Westermarck, Edward
Sometimes custom even requires that the life of the captive shall be spared.
It is against Masai tradition to kill prisoners of war.69 Among the Kabyles “il faut que l’exaspération des partis soit extrême pour qu’un blessé ou un prisonnier soit mis à mort.”70 The Touareg do not kill their prisoners after a fight.71 Among the Bedouins of the Euphrates “the person of the enemy is sacred when disarmed or dismounted; and prisoners are neither enslaved nor held to other ransom than their mares.”72 “Captives,” says Mr. Dorsey, “were not slain by the Omahas and Ponkas. When peace was declared the captives were sent home, if they wished to go. If not they could remain where they were, and were treated as if they were members of the tribe.”73 Among the Wyandots prisoners of war were frequently adopted into the tribe. “The warrior taking the prisoner has the first right to adopt him. If no one claims the prisoner for this purpose, he is caused to run the gauntlet as a test of his courage. If at his trial he behaves manfully claimants are not wanting, but if he behaves disgracefully he is put to death.”74
Thus we notice even among uncivilised races very obvious traces of what is called “international law,”75 if not as a rule, at least as an exception. On the other hand, the readiness with which war is engaged in, not only in self-defence or out of revenge, but for the sake of gain, indicates how little regard is paid to human life outside the tribe. The Kandhs, for instance, maintain “that a state of war may be lawfully presumed against all tribes and nations with whom no express agreement to the contrary exists.”76 And if a few savage peoples live in perpetual peace, it seems that the chief reason for this is not a higher standard of morality, but the absence of all inducements to war.
When we from the lower races pass to peoples more advanced in culture, we find that the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the tribe, and that the circle within which homicide is prohibited as a crime of the first order has been extended accordingly. But the old distinction between injuries committed against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains. Even when the subject is not touched upon in the laws referring to homicide we may, from the general attitude of the people towards members of other nations, infer that public opinion is not very scrupulous as to the taking of their lives. How the Chinese looked upon the “red-haired barbarians,” the “foreign devils,” is well known from recent history. In former days, Japan’s attitude towards her neighbours and the whole world was that of an enemy and not of a friend.77 The Vedic hymns are full of imprecations of misfortune upon men of another race.78 That among the ancient Teutons the lot of a stranger was not an enviable one is testified even by language; the German word elender has acquired its present meaning from the connotation of the older word which meant an “outlandish” man.79 The stranger as such—unless he belonged to a friendly, neighbouring tribe—had originally no legal rights at all; for his protection he was dependent on individual hospitality, and hospitality was restricted by custom to three days only.80 According to the Swedish Westgöta-Lag, he who killed a foreigner had to pay no compensation to the dead man’s relatives, nor was he outlawed, nor exiled.81 The Laws of King
Ine let us understand in what light a stranger was looked upon:—“If a far-coming man, or a stranger, journey through a wood out of the highway, and neither shout nor blow his horn, he is to be held for a thief, either to be slain or redeemed.”82 However, as commerce increased and the stranger was more often seen in Teutonic lands, royal protection was extended to him; and a consequence of this was that thenceforth he who killed the stranger had to pay a wergeld, part, or the whole, of which went to the king.83 In Greece, in early times, the “contemptible stranger”84 had no legal rights, and was protected only in case he was the guest of a citizen;85 and even later on, at Athens, whilst the intentional killing of a citizen was punished with death and confiscation of the murderer’s property, the intentional killing of a non-citizen was punished only with exile.86 The Latin word hostis was originally used to denote a foreigner;87 and the saying of Plautus, that a man is a wolf to a man whom he does not know,88 was probably an echo of an old Roman proverb. Mommsen suggests that in ancient days the Romans did not punish the killing of a foreigner, unless he belonged to an allied nation; but already in the prehistoric period a change was introduced, the foreigner being placed under the protection of the State.89
How little regard is felt for the lives of strangers also appears from the readiness with which war is waged on foreign nations, combined with the estimation in which the successful warrior is held by his countrymen. The ancient Mexicans were never at a loss for an excuse to pick a quarrel with their neighbours, so as to be able to procure victims for sacrifices to their gods.90 “No profession was held in more esteem amongst them than the profession of arms. The deity of war was the most revered by them, and regarded as the chief protector of the nation.”91 The Mayas not only wanted to increase their dominions by encroachments upon their neighbours’ territory, but undertook raids with no other object than that of obtaining captives for sacrifice.92 Speaking of the wars of the ancient Egyptians, M. Amélineau observes, “Nous n’avons pas un seul mot dans la littérature égyptienne, même dans les œuvres égypto-chrétiennes, qui nous fasse entendre le plus léger cri de réprobation pour la guerre et ses horreurs.”93 Among the Hebrews the most cruel wars of extermination were expressly sanctioned by their religion. That an idolatrous people had no right to live was taken as a matter of course; but wars were also unscrupulously waged from worldly motives, and in their moral code there is no attempt to distinguish between just and unjust war.94 Among the Mohammedans it is likewise the unbeliever, not the foreigner as such, that is regarded as the most proper object of slaughter.
Although there is no precept in the Koran which, taken with the context, justifies unprovoked war,95 the saying that “Paradise is under the shadow of swords”96 is popularly applied to all warfare against infidels. Among the Celts97 and Teutons a man’s highest aspiration was to acquire military glory. The Scandinavians considered it a disgrace for a man to die without having seen human blood flow;98 even the slaying of a tribesman they often regarded lightly when it had been done openly and bravely. In Greece, in ancient times at least, war was the normal relation between different states, and peace an exception, for which a special treaty was required;99 while to conquer and enslave barbarians was regarded as a right given to the Greeks by Nature. The whole statecraft of the early Republic of Rome was no doubt based upon similar principles;100 and in later days, also, the war policy of the Romans was certainly not conducted with that conscientiousness which was insisted upon by some of their writers.
Source notes
62 Abreu de Galindo, History of the Discovery and Conquest of the Canary Islands, p. 66.
63 Hanoteau and Letourneux, La Kabylie, ii. 76.
64 Hourst, Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs, p. 223 sq.
65 Thomson, Through Masai Land, p. 177.
66 Hinde, The Last of the Masai, p. 6, n.*
67 Baker, Albert N’yanza, i. 355.
68 Casalis, op. cit. p. 223 sq. For regard paid to women, old people, and children in war, see also Richardson, Arctic Searching Expedition, i. 367 (Western Eskimo); Catlin, North American Indians, ii. 240; Azara, Voyages, ii. 145 (Payaguas).
69 Hinde, op. cit. p. 64.
70 Hanoteau and Letourneux, op. cit. 75.
71 Hourst, op. cit. p. 207.
72 Blunt, op. cit. ii. 239.
73 Dorsey, ‘Omaha Sociology,’ in Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn. iii. 332.
74 Powell, ibid. i. 68.
75 See also Wheeler, The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations in Australia, passim.
76 Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal, iii. 75.
77 Griffis, Religions of Japan, p. 129.
78 Roth, ‘On the Morality of the Veda,’ in Jour. American Oriental Society, iii. 338.
79Cf. Grimm, Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, p. 396; Gummere, Germanic Origins, p. 288.
80 Grimm, op. cit. p. 397 sqq. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtgeschichte, i. 273.
81Westgöta-Lagen I. Af mandrapi, v. 4 p. 13.
82Laws of Ine, 20. Cf.Laws of Wihtræd, 28.
83 Brunner, op. cit. i. 273 sq. Gummere, op. cit. p. 288. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. i. 52.
84Iliad, ix. 648.
85 Hermann-Blümner, Lehrsbüch der griechischen Privatalterthümer, p. 492. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, ii. 325.
86 Meier and Schömann, Der altische Process, p. 379.
87 Cicero, De officiis, i. 12.
88 Plautus, Asinaria, ii. 4. 88.
89 Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht, p. 622 sqq.
90 Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific States, ii. 420. Clavigero, History of Mexico, i. 371.
91 Clavigero, op. cit. i. 363.
92 Bancroft, op. cit. ii. 740, 745.
93 Amélineau, L’évolution des idées morales dans l’Égypte ancienne, p. 344.
94Cf. Seldeft, De Synedriis et Præfecturis Juridicis veterum Ebræorum, iii. 12, p. 1179 sqq.; Lament, Études sur l’histoire de l’humanité, i. 384 sq.