CONTENTS.
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Smith, Adam
Of the sense of merit and demerit
97
Chap. I.That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment
98
Chap. II.Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
102
Chap. III.That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it
106
Chap. IV.Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters
109
Chap. V.The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit
112
SECTION II.
Of justice and beneficence
119
Chap. I.Comparison of those two virtues
ibid.
Chap. II.Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit
126
Chap. III.Of the utility of this constitution of nature
132
SECTION III.
Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions
145
Chap. I.Of the causes of this influence of fortune
148
Chap. II.Of the extent of this influence of fortune
154
Chap. III.Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments
167
PART III.
Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.
Chap. I.Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame
173
Chap. II.In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general rules
180
Chap. III.Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity
207
Chap. IV.In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives
223