Roman Stoicism being lectures on the history of the Stoic...

[1] e.g. Zeller, Stoics etc. pp. 16, 17; Stein Psych. ii p. 141.

[2] See Alex. Aph. de fato, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).

[3] See above, § 75.

[4] λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.

[5] ‘Chrysippus sic incipit: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ... κανόνα εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων’ Marcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); ‘lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria’ Cic. Leg. i 6, 18.

[6] ‘Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur’ Cic. Tusc. disp. v 37, 108; [Διογένης] ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη “κοσμοπολίτης” ἔφη Diog. L. vi 63; so Epict. Disc. i 9, 1.

[7] Arnim i 262; ‘patriam meam esse mundum sciam’ Sen. Dial. vii 20, 5.

[8] ‘membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit’ Ep. 95, 52.

[9] ‘quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere’ Cic. Leg. i 10, 29 and 30.

[10] ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα Diog. L. vii 129; ‘quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis’ Cic. Fin. iii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.

[11] ‘nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit’ Cic. Leg. i 10, 31; ‘if the mind-element is common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational; and therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship’ M. Aurel. To himself iv 4.

[12] Plut. Sto. rep. 4, i.

[13] ‘duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi’ Sen. Dial. viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus: ‘What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods and men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state’ Disc. ii 5, 26.

[14] ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη [ὁ Ζήνων] τὸν Ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263); ‘salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest’ Sen. Dial. iv 31, 7.

[15] ‘eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate’ Cic. Off. i 16, 50.

[16] φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 128; ‘ius esse natura [Stoici censent]’ Cic. Fin. iii 21, 71.

[17] ‘non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est’ Cic. Leg. ii 5, 10.

[18] ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἱκοδομεῖν Plut. Sto. rep. 6, 1; ἀπαγορεύει ἀγάλματα τεκταίνειν Theod. Aff. iii 74 (Arnim i 264).

[19] Plut. Sto. rep. 6, 1.

[20] Diog. L. vii 33.

[21] Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that upon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato’s Republic; Sto. rep. 8, 1.

[22] Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial to the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay of literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied the needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. § 336.

[23] Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it was by Seneca: ‘quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae centesimae?’ Sen. Ben. vii 10, 4.

[24] Diog. L. vii 131.

[25] ‘More continent than Zeno’ became a proverb at Athens; ib. 27.

[26]ib. 121.

[27] ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες Origen cont. Celsum, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).

[28] This principle is stated by Chrysippus: πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν ἀποβλέπειν Plut. Sto. rep. 22, 1.

[29] The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated in the development of Roman law: ‘led by their theory of natural law, the [Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity’ Maine, Ancient Law, p. 154. Cf. on the whole subject Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, bk v ch. 13: e.g. ‘to the common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as ... in modern times’ (vol. iii p. 119).

[30] See § 431.

[31] ‘What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!’ Epict. Disc. ii 4, 8.

[32] καὶ μητράσι [Χρύσιππος] λέγει συνέρχεσθαι καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ υἱοῖς Diog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; εἶπον ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν Origen cont. Cels. iv 45 (Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.

[33] Arnim i 256.

[34] Origen, as above.

[35] See below, § 478.

[36] See above, § 254.

[37] Arnim i 253.

[38]ib. i 254.

[39] Diog. L. vii 121.

[40] Arnim iii 748.