The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

[196] Proclus elsewhere informs us in these Commentaries, that the soul of the world is called by Orpheus Ippa.

[197] i.e. Vesta.

[198] i.e. Juno.

[199] i.e. Having a good dæmon.

[200] Instead of εις δαιμων εγενετο μεγας αρχος απο παντων, it is requisite to read εις δαιμων γενετο μεγας αρχος απαντων.

[201] For αφανη here, it is necessary to read εμφανη.

[202] For συμβολικης των θεων παρουσιας, it is requisite to read συμβολικα της των, κ. λ.

[203] After του οντως here, it is requisite to supply οντος.

[204] The part within the brackets is wanting in the original, in which there is evidently a defect, as the stars at the end of the proposition indicate.

[205] Here also the part within the brackets is wanting in the original.

[206] For εαυτῳ here it is necessary to read εαυτο.

[207] It is here necessary to supply the words αφ’ εαυτου.

[208] This is asserted by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics.

[209] In Prop. 5.

[210] For τοις αιτιοις here, it is obviously necessary to read τοις αιτιατοις.

[211] For ων το μεν αυτην διδωσι, it is necessary to read ων το μετ’ αυτην διδωσι.

[212] From the 11th Proposition.

[213] From the 7th Proposition.

[214] ει is wanting in the original.

[215] This is asserted in the Phædrus of Plato.

[216] That if an essence is inseparable from body, it is impossible that the energy proceeding from this essence should be separate from body, Aristotle also demonstrates in his treatise On the Soul.

[217] The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, though perfectly necessary to the demonstration of the Proposition. Hence, the words ολον κινει, μερος δε κινειται, η, must be supplied.

[218] For if the whole moves, the part which is moved will at the same time be motive.

[219] The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus for instance we see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, another from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another from the eyes of many animals. But this light though various, is every where similar, and discovers in its operations a unity of nature. On account of its uniformity therefore, it requires one principle and not different principles. But the sun is the only principle of all mundane light. And though there are many participants of light posterior to the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light, through one solar nature, property and power. But if we again seek for the principle of light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is this principle; for the various parts of it diffuse many illuminations. There will therefore, be many principles. But we now require one first principle of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we must observe that this is not effected by her psychical multiplicity, or she would diffuse different lights. Hence we must assert that she generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity of intellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity; and through this it becomes a God.

This divine unity of the sun therefore, is the principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all intelligible natures.

[220] The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the intellect which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. And imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with body. And so in other things.

[221] Instead of ει γαρ αγονον, it is necessary to read η γαρ αγονον.

[222] The original here is both defective and incorrect. Instead therefore of τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μαχεται, I read παν δε τινος γενομενον υφ’ ου μετεχεται.

[223] Instead of και οτι αλλο in this place, it appears to me to be necessary to read και οτι αλλως.

[224] Instead of μετ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read μετ’ αυτο.

[225] For παρον here, it is necessary to read παραγον.

[226] Instead of προς παν here, it is necessary to read προς αιτιον.

[227] Instead of πως το διακριθεν, it is necessary to read πως το μη διακριθεν.

[228] For το απ’ αυτου here, it is necessary to read τῳ απ’ αυτου.

[229] For το επιστρεφον, it is requisite to read το μη επιστερφον.

[230] There is a defect here in the original, which may be supplied, if instead of εστι την απο της ουσιας προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον we read ει ουν εστι κατα την απο της ουσιας ενεργειαν προς εαυτο επιστρεπτικον.

[231] ουπω is omitted in the original.

[232] For μεριστην εαυτου, it is requisite to read μεριστον εαυτον.

[233] The truth of this reasoning may be evinced by the following considerations. Every thing which is measured by time, and such is every corporeal nature, depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present and future. And if we conceive that any one of these parts is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time therefore is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being such as it is, depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential, must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing; since, unless they flowed in conjunction with time, they would be separated from it, and would consequently perish. Hence, as we cannot affirm with propriety of any part of time, that it is; since even before we can form the assertion, the present time is no more; so with respect to all corporeal natures, from their subsistence in time, before we can say they exist, they lose all identity of being.

Such then is the unreal condition of every thing existing in time, or of every thing corporeal, and entangled with matter. But this shadowy essence of body is finely unfolded by Plotinus, in the 6th book of his 3rd Ennead, as follows: “Being (says he) properly so called is neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and its properties belong to the region of non-entity. But you will ask, how is it possible, that visible matter should possess no real being; that matter in which stones and mountains reside, the solid earth, and bodies which mutually resist; since bodies which impel each other, confess by their collision, the reality of their existence? You will likewise ask after what manner things which neither strike against, nor resist each other, which neither externally act, nor internally suffer, nor are in any respect the objects of sight, viz. soul and intellect, are to be reckoned true and real beings. We reply, that on the contrary, things more corpulent are more sluggish and inert, as is evident in bulky masses of earth. But whatever is less ponderous is more moveable, and the more elevated the more moveable. Hence fire, the most moveable of all the elements, flies as it were from a corporeal nature. Besides, as it appears to me, whatever is more sufficient to itself, disturbs others less and brings less inconvenience; but such things as are more ponderous and terrene, unable from their defect of being to raise themselves on high and becoming debile and languid, strike and oppress surrounding bodies, by their falling ruin and sluggish weight.