Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2

Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,1 frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy:— the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.2 It is much the same contrast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopê of Euripides — which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.3

As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths relinquish4 their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? How do you mean fine (replies the athlete)? They are only prosing about astronomical matters — talking nonsense — philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity.

Sokr. — You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.5 Pray explain to me what philosophy is. Erast. — I will do so readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man’s knowledge — in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both in youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible during life. Philosophy is polymathy.6 Sokr. — You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? Erast. — Yes — very good. Sokr. — But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? Is a man’s bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good for the body?7

In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?

It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes sides with Sokrates8) that in regard to exercise and food it is not the great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body — but the moderate or measured quantity.9 For the mind, the case is admitted to be similar. Not the much, nor the little, of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount. Sokr. — And who is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? Erast. — The physician and the gymnastic trainer. Sokr. — Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? Erast. — The farmer. Sokr. — Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and how much of each is right measure?

No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise.

The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.10 None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: Sokr. — Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all things — what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the matters which he ought to learn? Erast. — The finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know:— that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.11 Sokr. — But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent — much less several considerable arts. Erast. — I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself — but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.12

Sokr. — You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five matches taken together.13 Erast. — Yes — I mean what you say. He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends to all of them in reasonable measure.14

Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: Sokr. — Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? Erast. — Yes I do. Sokr. — You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? Erast. — Certainly: extremely useful. Sokr. — But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If you fall sick will you send for one of them, or for a professional physician? Erast. — I should send for both. Sokr. — That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for first and by preference? Erast. — No doubt I shall send for the professional physician. Sokr. — The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Our philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.15 Erast. — Yes; that was agreed.

Sokr. — If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with different professional subjects, or this multiplication of learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise.16

Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad? Erast. — Yes: such is the fact.

Sokr. — Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? Erast. — It is so.17 Sokr. — The art or science, whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? Erast. — Yes: he is. Sokr. — To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly — or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, Know thyself, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.18 Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.19 Erast. — I admit it.