The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended from them; because from these it is possible to know their different hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods; since, as participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the things that are participated.