The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this, however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the conversion is according to nature.

From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order.