The Secret Doctrine, Vol. 2 of 4 The Synthesis of...

We respect those men of Science who, wise in their generation, say: The Prehistoric Past being utterly beyond our powers of direct observation, we are too honest, too devoted to the truth—or what we regard as truth—to speculate upon the unknown, giving out our unproven theories along with facts absolutely established in Modern Science.

This is a wise and an honest sentence in the mouth of a Materialist. But when a Hæckel, after just saying that “historical events of past time,” having “occurred many millions of years ago,1583 ... are for ever removed from direct observation,” and that neither Geology nor Phylogeny1584 can or will “rise to the position of a real ‘exact’ science,” then insists on the development of all organisms—“from the lowest vertebrate to the highest, from amphioxus to man”—we ask for a weightier proof than he can give. Mere “empirical sources of knowledge,” so extolled by the author of Anthropogeny—when he has to be satisfied with the qualification for his own views—are not competent to settle problems lying beyond their domain; nor is it the province of exact Science to place any reliance on them.1585 If “empirical”—and [pg 701] Hæckel himself declares so repeatedly—then they are no better, nor any more reliable, in the sight of exact research, when extended into the remote past, than are our Occult teachings of the East, both having to be placed on the same level. Nor are his phylogenetic and palingenetic speculations treated any more favourably by the real Scientists, than are our cyclic repetitions of the evolution of the great in the minor races, and the original order of Evolution. For the province of exact, real Science, materialistic though it be, is to carefully avoid anything like guess-work, speculation which cannot be verified; in short, all suppressio veri and all suggestio falsi.

The business of the men of exact Science is to observe, each in his chosen department, the phenomena of Nature; to record, tabulate, compare and classify the facts, down to the smallest minutiæ which are presented to the observation of the senses with the help of all the exquisite mechanism that modern invention supplies, not by the aid of metaphysical flights of fancy. All that he has a legitimate right to do, is to correct by the assistance of physical instruments the defects or illusions of his own coarser vision, auditory powers, and other senses. He has no right to trespass on the grounds of Metaphysics and Psychology. His duty is to verify and to rectify all the facts that fall under his direct observation; to profit by the experiences and mistakes of the Past in endeavouring to trace the working of a certain concatenation of cause and effect, which—but only by its constant and unvarying repetition—may be called a Law. This it is which a man of Science is expected to do, if he would become a teacher of men and remain true to his original programme of natural or physical Sciences. Any side path from this royal road becomes speculation.

Instead of keeping to this, what does many a so-called man of Science do in these days? He rushes into the domain of pure Metaphysics, while deriding them. He delights in rash conclusions and calls them “a deductive law from the inductive law” of a theory based upon and drawn out of the depths of his own consciousness—that consciousness being perverted by, and honeycombed with, one-sided Materialism. He attempts to explain the “origin” of things, which are yet embosomed only in his own conceptions. He attacks spiritual beliefs and religious traditions millenniums old, and denounces everything, save his own hobbies, as superstition. He suggests theories of the Universe, a cosmogony developed by blind, mechanical forces of Nature alone, far more miraculous and impossible than even one based [pg 702] upon the assumption of fiat lux ex nihilo—and tries to astonish the world by his wild theory; and this theory, being known to emanate from a scientific brain, is taken, on blind faith, as very scientific and as the outcome of Science.

Are these the opponents Occultism should dread? Most decidedly not. For such theories are treated no better by real Science than are our own by empirical Science. Hæckel, hurt in his vanity by du Bois-Reymond, is never tired of publicly complaining of the latter's onslaught on his fantastic theory of descent. Rhapsodizing on “the exceedingly rich storehouse of empirical evidence,” he calls those “recognized Physiologists” who oppose every speculation of his drawn from the said “storehouse”—ignorant men, and declares:

If many men, and among them even some Scientists of repute—hold that the whole of phylogeny is a castle in the air, and genealogical trees [from monkeys?] are empty plays of phantasy, they only in speaking thus demonstrate their ignorance of that wealth ofempirical sources of knowledgeto which reference has already been made.1586

No Occultist or “Magician,” has ever been treated to any worse epithets. Yet the Occultist remains on his own metaphysical grounds, and does not endeavour to rank his knowledge, the fruits of his personal observation and experience, among the exact Sciences of modern learning. He keeps within his legitimate sphere, where he is master. But what is one to think of a rank Materialist, whose duty is clearly traced before him, who uses such an expression as this:

A “theory” is simply a hypothesis, a speculation, and not a law. To say otherwise is one of the many liberties taken now-a-days by Scientists. They enunciate an absurdity, and then hide it behind the shield of Science. A deduction from theoretical speculation is nothing [pg 703] more than a speculation on a speculation. Sir William Hamilton has already shown that the word theory is now used

In a very loose and improper sense ... that it is convertible intohypothesis, andhypothesisis commonly used as another term forconjecture, whereas the terms“theory”and“theoretical”are properly used in opposition to the terms practice and practical.

But Modern Science puts an extinguisher on the latter statement, and mocks at the idea. Materialistic Philosophers and Idealists of Europe and America may be agreed with the Evolutionists as to the physical origin of man, yet it will never become a general truth with the true Metaphysician; and the latter defies the Materialists to make good their arbitrary assumptions. That the ape-theory theme1588 of Vogt and Darwin, on which the Huxley-Hæckelians have of late composed such extraordinary variations, is far less scientific—because clashing with the fundamental laws of that theme itself—than ours can ever be shown to be, is very easy of demonstration. Let the reader only turn to the excellent work on Human Species by the great French Naturalist de Quatrefages, and our statement will at once be verified.

They must have been once covered with hair, both sexes having beards; their ears were probably pointed and capable of movement; and their bodies were provided with a tail, having the proper muscles. Their limbs and bodies were also acted on by many muscles which now only occasionally reäppear, but are normally present in the Quadrumana.... The foot was then prehensile, judging from the condition of the great toe in the fœtus; and our progenitors, no doubt, were arboreal in their habits, and frequented some warm forest-clad land. The males had great canine teeth, which served them as formidable weapons.1589

And consequently removes him a stage backward in the scale of evolution. The English naturalist is not satisfied to take his stand upon the ground of his own doctrines, and, like Hæckel, on this point places himself in direct variance with one of the fundamental laws which constitute the principal charm of Darwinism.

In fact, in the theory of Darwin, transmutations do not take place, either by chance or in every direction. They are ruled by certain laws which are due to the organization itself. If an organism is once modified in a given direction, it can undergo secondary or tertiary transmutations, but will still preserve the impress of the original. It is the law ofpermanent characterization, whichalonepermits Darwin to explain the filiation of groups, their characteristics, and their numerous relations. It is by virtue of this law thatallthe descendants of the first mollusc have been molluscs;allthe descendants of the first vertebrate have been vertebrates. It is clear that this constitutes one of the foundations of the doctrine. It follows that two beings belonging to two distinct types can be referred toa common ancestor, but the one cannot be the descendant of the other.

Now man and apes present a very striking contrast inrespect to type. Their organs ... correspond almost exactly term for term: but these organs are arranged after a very different plan. In man they are so arranged that he is essentially awalker, while in apes they necessitate his being aclimber.... There is here an anatomical and mechanical distinction.... A glance at the page where Huxley has figured side by side a human skeleton and the skeletons of the most highly developed apes is a sufficiently convincing proof.

The consequence of these facts, from the point of view of the logical application of the law ofpermanent characterizations, is that man cannot be descended from an ancestor who is already characterized as an ape, any more than a catarrhine tailless ape can be descended from a tailed catarrhine. Awalking animalcannot be descended from aclimbingone. This was clearly understood by Vogt.

In placing man among the primates, he declares without hesitation that the lowest class of apes have passed the landmark (the common ancestor), from which the different types of this family have originated and diverged. [This ancestor of the apes, Occult Science sees in the lowest human group during the Atlantean period, as shown before.] We must, then, place the origin of man beyond the last ape [corroborating our doctrine], if we wish to adhere to one of the laws most emphatically necessary to the Darwinian theory. We then come to the prosimiæ of Hæckel, the loris, indris, etc. But these animals also are climbers; we must go further, therefore, in search of our first direct ancestor. But the genealogy by Hæckel brings us from the latter to themarsupials. From men to the kangaroo the distance is certainly great. Now neither living nor extinct fauna show the intermediate types which ought to serve as landmarks. This difficulty[pg 705]causes but slight embarrassment to Darwin.1590We know that he considers the want of information upon similar questions as a proof in his favour. Hæckel doubtless is as little embarrassed. He admits the existence of an absolutely theoreticalpithecoid man.

Thus, since it has been proved that, according to Darwinism itself, the origin of man must be placed beyond the eighteenth stage, and since it becomes, in consequence,necessaryto fill up the gap between marsupials and man, will Hæckel admit the existence offour unknown intermediate groupsinstead of one? Will he complete his genealogy in this manner? It is not for me to answer.1591

And now turn to de Quatrefages' The Human Species,1593 and see his proofs, based on the latest discoveries, to show that the Prosimiæ of Hæckel have no decidua and a diffuse placenta. They cannot be the ancestors of the apes even, let alone man, according to a fundamental law of Darwin himself, as the great French Naturalist shows. But this does not dismay the “animal theorists” in the least, for self-contradiction and paradoxes are the very soul of modern Darwinism. Witness—Mr. Huxley; having himself shown, with regard to fossil man and the “missing link,” that:

and that to “deny the existence of this gap would be as reprehensible as absurd,” the great man of Science denies his own words in actu by supporting with all the weight of his scientific authority that most “absurd” of all theories—the descent of man from an ape!

Indeed, Hæckel bases his descent of man on the seventeenth and eighteenth stages, the Marsupialia and Prosimiæ—(genus Hæckelii?). Applying the latter term to the Lemuridæ—hence making of them animals with a placenta—he commits a zoological blunder. For after [pg 706] having himself divided mammals according to their anatomical differences into two groups—the indeciduata, which have no decidua (or special membrane uniting the placentæ), and the deciduata, those who possess it—he includes the Prosimiæ in the latter group. Now we have shown elsewhere what other men of Science had to say to this. As de Quatrefages says:

The anatomical investigations of ... Milne Edwards and Grandidier upon the animals ... place it beyond all doubt that the Prosimiæ of Hæckel have no decidua and a diffuse placenta. They areindeciduata. Far from any possibility of their being the ancestors of the apes, according to the principles laid down by Hæckel himself, they cannot even be regarded as the ancestors of the zonoplacental mammals ... and ought to be connected with the Pachydermata, the Edentata, and the Cetacea.1594

The above mistake, if indeed it be one, is not even hinted at in Hæckel's Pedigree of Man, translated by Aveling. If the excuse may stand good that at the time the famous “genealogies” were made, “the embryogenesis of the Prosimiæ was not known,” it is familiar now. We shall see whether the next edition of Aveling's translation will have this important error rectified, or if the seventeenth and eighteenth stages will remain as they are to blind the profane, as one of the real intermediate links. But, as the French Naturalist observes:

It comes to this. Grant to man an immortal Spirit and Soul; endow the whole animate and inanimate creation with the monadic principle gradually evolving from latent and passive into active and positive polarity—and Hæckel will not have a leg to stand upon, whatever his admirers may say.

But there are important divergencies even between Darwin and Hæckel. While the former makes us proceed from the tailed catarrhine, Hæckel traces our hypothetical ancestor to the tailless ape, though, at the same time, he places him in a hypothetical “stage” immediately preceding this—Menocerca with tails (nineteenth stage).