Before BOOK V.
Project Gutenberg EPUB edition
Plato and Benjamin Jowett
Very true, he said.
The conclusion that the same three principles exist both in the State and in the individual applied to each of them. And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and that they are three in number.
Exactly.
Must we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?
Certainly.
D Also that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes courage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the same relation to all the other virtues?
Assuredly.
And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in which the State is just?
That follows, of course.
We cannot but remember that the justice of the State E consisted in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?
We are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.
We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?
Yes, he said, we must remember that too.
And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?
Certainly.
Music and gymnastic will harmonize passion and reason. These two combined will control desire, And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and 442soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?
Quite true, he said.
And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having 135 learned truly to know their own functions, will rule5 over the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the Bconcupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?
Very true, he said.
and will be the best defenders both of body and soul. Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?
True.
The courageous. And he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains Cin pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?
Right, he replied.
The wise. And him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which proclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?
Assuredly.
The temperate. And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and Ddesire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?
Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.
The just. And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what quality a man will be just.
That is very certain.
And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found her to be in the State? 136
There is no difference in my opinion, he said.
The nature of justice illustrated by commonplace instances. Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few Ecommonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.
What sort of instances do you mean?
If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just 443State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this?
No one, he replied.
Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?
Never.
Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?
Source notes
4Od. xx. 17, quoted supra, III. 390 D.
5Reading προστατήσετον with Bekker; or, if the reading προστήσετον, which is found in the MSS., be adopted, then the nominative must be supplied from the previous sentence: ‘Music and gymnastic will place in authority over …’ This is very awkward, and the awkwardness is increased by the necessity of changing the subject at τηρήσετον.