The origin and development of the moral ideas

It has been said that a man who acts under the influence of great passion has not, at the time, a full knowledge of the nature and quality of his act, and that the clemency of the law is “a condescension to the frailty of the human frame, to the furor brevis, which, while the frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to the voice of reason.”110 But the main cause for passion extenuating his guilt is not the intellectual disability under which he acts, but the fact that he is carried away by an impulse which is too strong for his will to resist. This is implied in the provision of the law, that “provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he has received.”111

That anger has been so generally recognised as an extenuation of guilt is largely due to the fact that the person who provokes it is himself blamable; both morality and law take into consideration the degree of provocation to which the agent was exposed. But, at the same time, the pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will may by itself be a sufficient ground for extenuation. In certain cases of mental disease a morbid impulse or idea may take such a despotic possession of the patient as to drive him to the infliction of an injury. He is mad, and yet he may be free from delusion and exhibit no marked derangement of intelligence. He may be possessed with an idea or impulse to kill somebody which he cannot resist. Or he may yield to a morbid impulse to steal or to set fire to houses or other property, without having any ill-feeling against the owner or any purpose to serve by what he does.112 The deed to which the patient is driven is frequently one which he abhors, as when a mother kills the child which she loves most.113 In such cases the agent is of course acquitted by the moral judge, and if he is condemned by the law of his country and its guardians, the reason for this can be nothing but ignorance.

We must remember that this form of madness was hardly known even to medical men till the end of the 18th century,114 when Pinel, to his own surprise, discovered that there were “many madmen who at no period gave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but who were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties had alone sustained injury.”115 And there can be no doubt that the fourteen English judges who formulated the law on the criminal responsibility of the insane, made no reference to this manie sans délire simply because they had not sufficient knowledge of the subject with which they had to deal.116

That moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good, not only of moral blame, but of moral praise. Every religion presents innumerable examples of people who do “good deeds” only in expectation of heavenly reward. This implies the assumption that the Deity judges upon actions without much regard to their motives; for if motives were duly considered, a man could not be held rewardable for an act which he performs solely for his own benefit. We are told that the homage which the Chinese “render the gods and goddesses believed to be concerned in the management of the affairs of this world is exceedingly formal, mechanical, and heartless,” and that “there seems to be no special importance attached to purity of heart.”117 According to Caldwell, “the Hindu religionist enjoins the act alone, and affirms that motives have nothing to do with merit.”118 The argument, “Obey the law because it will profit you to do so,” constitutes the fundamental motive of Deuteronomy, as appears from phrases like these: “That it may go well with thee,” “That thy days may be prolonged.”119 Speaking of the modern Egyptians, Lane observes that “from their own profession it appears that they are as much excited to the giving of alms by the expectation of enjoying corresponding rewards in heaven as by pity for the distresses of their fellow-creatures, or a disinterested wish to do the will of God.”120 Something similar may be said, not only of the “good

Such views, however, cannot hold their ground against the verdict of the scrutinising moral consciousness. They have been repeatedly contradicted by the great teachers of morality. Confucius required an inward sincerity in all outward practice, and poured scorn on the pharisaism which contented itself with the cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter.122 He said that, “in the rites of mourning, exceeding grief with deficient rites is better than little demonstration of grief with superabounding rites; and that in those of sacrifice, exceeding reverence with deficient rites is better than an excess of rites with but little reverence.”123 “Sacrifice is not a thing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has its birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it by ceremonies.”124 The virtuous man offers his sacrifices “without seeking for anything to be gained by them.”125 “The Master said, ‘See what a man does.

Mark his motives.’”126 The popular Taouist work, called ‘The Book of Secret Blessings,’ inculcates the necessity of purifying the heart as a preparation for all right-doing.127 The religious legislator of Brahmanism, whilst assuming in accordance with the popular view that the fulfilment of religious duty will be always rewarded to some extent, whatever may be the motive, maintains that the man who fulfils his duties without regard to the rewards which follow the fulfilment, will enjoy the highest happiness in this life and eternal happiness hereafter.128 According to the Buddhistic Dhammapada, “if a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage…. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him.”129 In his description of the Buddhists of Mongolia, the Rev. James Gilmour observes:—“Mongol priests recognise the power of motive in estimating actions…. The attitude of the mind decides the nature of the act. He that offers a cup of cold water only, in a proper spirit, has presented a gift quite as acceptable as the most magnificent of donations.”130 With reference to the Hebrews, Mr. Montefiore says:—“If it were true that the later Judaism of the law laid exclusive stress in its moral teaching upon the mere outward act and not upon the spirit—upon doing rather than being, as we might nowadays express it—we should scarcely find that constant harping upon the heart as the source and seat of good and evil. What more legal book than Chronicles?

Yet it is there that we find the earnest supplication for a heart directed towards God…. The eudæmonistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy; it is weakest with the Rabbis.”131 Few sayings are quoted and applied more frequently in the Rabbinical literature than the adage which closes those tractates of the Mishna which deal with the sacrificial law:—“He that brings few offerings is as he that brings many; let his heart be directed heavenward.”132 The same faults which Jesus chastises in the hypocritical Rabbis of his day are also chastised in the Talmud. It is said, “Before a man prays let him purify his heart,”133 and, “Sin committed with a good motive is better than a precept fulfilled from a bad motive.”134 Rabbi Elazar says, “No charity is rewarded but according to the degree of benevolence in it, for it is said, ‘Sow (a reward) for yourselves in giving alms as charity, you will reap according to the benevolence.’”135 Nor is the doctrine which requires disinterested motives for the performance of good deeds foreign to Muhammedan moralists. “Whatever we give,” says the author of the Akhlâk-i-Jelâli, “should be given in the fulness of zeal and good-will…. We should spend it simply to please God, and not mix the act with any meaner motive, lest thereby it be rendered null and void.”136