Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series

f60 “Thus knowing, thus seeing,” (evam jānato evam passato) is one of the set phrases we encounter throughout Buddhist literature, Hinayana and Mahayana. Whether or not its compilers were aware of the distinction between knowing and seeing in the sense we make now in the theory of knowledge, the coupling is of great signification. They must have been conscious of the inefficiency and insufficiency of the word “to know” in the description of the kind of knowledge one has at the moment of enlightenment. “To see” or “to see face to face” signifies the immediateness and utmost perspicuity and certainty of such knowledge. As was mentioned elsewhere, Buddhism is rich in terminology of this order of cognition.

f61 Tassa evam jānato evam passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati bhavāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamit ñāṇaṁ hoti. Khina jāti vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ kataṁ karanīyam nāparaṁ itthattāyāti pajānāti.

f62The Brahmajāla Sutta, p. 43. Translation by Rhys Davids.

f63 The idea of performing miracles systematically through the power acquired by self-concentration seems to have been greatly in vogue in India even from the earliest days of her civilisation, and the Buddha was frequently approached by his followers to exhibit his powers to work wonders. In fact, his biographers later turned him into a regular miracle-performer, at least as far as we may judge by the ordinary standard of logic and science. But from the Prajñā-pāramitā point of view, according to which “because what was preached by the Tathagata as the possession of qualities, that was preached as no-possession of qualities by the Tathagata, and therefore it is called the possession of qualities,” (yaishā bhagavan lakshaṇasampat tathāgatena bhāshitā alakshaṇasampad eshā tathāgatena bhāshita; tenocyate lakshaṇasampad iti), the idea of performing wonders acquires quite a new signification spiritually. In the Kevaddha Sutta, three wonders are mentioned as having been understood and realised by the Buddha: the mystic wonder, the wonder of education, and the wonder of manifestation.

The possessor of the mystic wonder can work the following logical and physical impossibilities: “From being one he becomes multiform, from being multiform he becomes one: from being visible he becomes invisible: he passes without hindrance to the further side of a wall or a battlement or a mountain, as if through air: he penetrates up and down through solid ground as if through water: he walks on water without dividing it, as if on solid ground: he travels cross-legged through the sky like the birds on wing: he touches and feels with the hand even the moon and sun, beings of mystic power and potency they be: he reaches even in the body up to the heaven of Brahma.” Shall we understand this literally and intellectually? Cannot we interpret it in the spirit of the Prajñā-pāramitā idealism? Why? Taccittam yacittam acittam. (Thought is called thought because it is no-thought.)

f64 The questions are: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Potthapāda-Sutta.

f65 Cf. Dhammapada, v. 385. “He for whom there is neither this nor that side, nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brahman.”

f66Sutta-nipāta, v, 720. Sanantā yanti kussobbhā, tunḥī yāti mahodadhi.

f67 The Majjhima-Nikāya, 140, Dhātuvibhangasuttam. Asmīti bhikkhu maññitam etaṁ; Ayam aham asmīti maññitam etaṁ; Bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Na bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Rūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Arūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Saññī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Asaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Nevasaññi-nasaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ.

f68 Majjhima Nikāya, 22.

f69 Cf. Sutta-Nipāta, v. 21. “By me is made a well-constructed raft, so said Bhagavat, I have passed over to Nirvana, I have reached the further bank, having overcome the torrent of passions; there is no further use for a raft: therefore, if thou like, rain, O sky!”

f70 I left here “dharmas” untranslated. For this untranslatable term, some have “righteousness,” some “morality,” and some “qualities.” This is as is well known a difficult term to translate. The Chinese translators have rendered it by fa,[3.3] everywhere, regardless of the context. In the present case, “dharma” may mean “good conduct, “prescribed rules of morality,” or even “any religious teaching considered productive of good results.” In the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Chapter 1, reference is also made to the transcending of both “adharma” and “dharma,” saying: “Dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ prāgevādharmāḥ.” And it is explained that this distinction comes from falsely asserting (vikalpagrahaṇam) the dualism of what is and what is not, while the one is the self-reflection of the other. You look into the mirror and finding an image thereon you take it for a reality, while the image is yourself and nobody else. The one who views the world thus, has the rightful view of it, ya evam pasyati sa samyakpasyati. Indeed, when he takes hold of ekāgra (one-pointedness or oneness of things), he realises the state of mind in which his inner wisdom reveals itself (svapratyātmāryajñānagocara) and which is called the Tathāgatagarbha. In this illustration “dharma” and “adharma” are synonyms of being (sat) and non-being (asat) or affirmation (asti) and negation (nāsti). Therefore, the abandoning of dharma and adharma (dharmādharmayoḥ prahāṇaṁ) means the getting rid of dualism in all its complexities and implications.

Philosophically, this abandoning is to get identified with the Absolute, and morally to go beyond good and evil, right and wrong. Also compare Sutta-Nipāta, verse 886, where dualism is considered to be the outcome of false philosophical reasoning “Takkañ ca diṭṭhisu pakappayitvā, saccaṁ musā ti dvayadhammam āhu.”

f71 Abridged from the Majjhima Nikāya, 22, p. 139. Cf. also the Samyutta Nikāya, XII., 70. p. 125.

f72 For the Buddhist version of the story, see the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra chapter 4, and the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra, chapter 4 (Chinese translation).

f73 Samyutta XII., 65, Nagara; cf. also one of the Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras which is known as one preached by Mañjuśrī (Nanjo Catalogue, No. 21). In the Sutra we find that the Buddha, after mentioning the simile of a gem-digger, makes reference to a man who feels overwhelmed with delight when people talk pleasantly about the old towns and villages once visited by himself. The same sort of a delightful feeling is expressed by one who will listen to the discourse on Prajñāpāramitā and understand it; for he was in his past lives present at the assembly which was gathered about the Buddha delivering sermons on the same subject. That the understanding of the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā is a form of memory is highly illuminating when considered in relation to the theory of Enlightenment as advanced here.

That the ushering of Enlightenment is accompanied with the feeling of return or remembrance is also unmistakably noted by the writer of the Kena-Upanishad (VI., 50):

“Now in respect to the Atman:

It is as though something forces its way into consciousness

And consciousness suddenly remembers—

Such a state of mind illustrates the awakening of knowledge of the Atman.”

Sonadanda the Brahman had the following to say when he grasped the meaning of the Buddha’s discourse on the characteristics of the true Brahman (Rhys David’s translation): “Most excellent, oh Gotama, most excellent! Just as if a man were to set up that which has been thrown down, or were to reveal that which has been hidden away, or were to point out the right road to him who has gone astray, or were to bring a light into the darkness so that those who had eyes could see external forms—just even so has the truth been made known to me, in many a figure, by the venerable Gotama.”

f74Buddhacarita, translated by E. B. Cowell, pp. 131–132.

f75 Lefmann’s edition, p. 289.

f76Ariyapapariyesana-sutta, Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI., p. 167.

f77 Used to designate the school which upholds the doctrine of enlightenment (sambodhi).

f78 This translation is not at all satisfactory.

f79 Jōshu (778—897) was one of the early masters of Zen in the T‘ang dynasty when it began to flourish with its vigorous freshness. He attained to a high age of one hundred and twenty. His sermons were always short and to the point, and his answers are noted for their being so natural and yet so slippery, so hard to catch.

f80Six Essays by Bodhi-Dharma[4.25] is the book in which the so-called writings of Bodhi-Dharma are collected. See also the Essay “On Satori” which follows.

f81 For Tao-hsüan’s edition in the original Chinese, see Note 4.28 in the Appendix.

f82 This is the most significant phrase in Dharma’s writing. I have left it untranslated, for later this will be explained fully.

f83 The author of this story or prefatory note is T‘an-lin (Donrin), who, according to Dr. Tokiwa, of the Tokyo Imperial University, was a learned scholar partaking in the translation of several Sanskrit works. He is also mentioned in connection with Yeka (Hui-k‘ê) in the biography of the latter by Tao-hsüan. If Donrin were more of a scholar as we can see by this identification than a genuine Zen master, it was quite natural for him to write down this “Meditation on Four Acts,” which mainly appeals as it stands to the scholarly interpretation of Zen. While the doctrine of Pi-kwan is emphatically Zen, there is much in the “Meditation” that lends itself to the philosophising of Zen.

f84 Translated into Chinese during the Northern Liang dynasty which lasted A.D. 397–439. The translator’s name is lost.

f85大乘壁觀功業最高

f86 We read in Tao-hsüan’s Biographies that wherever Bodhi-Dharma stayed he taught people in his Zen doctrine, but as the whole country at the time was deeply plunged into scholastic discussions, there was a great deal of slanderous talk against meditation when they learned of Bodhi-Dharma’s message.

f87 Is it possible that this passage has some reference to the Vajrasamādhi where Bodhisattva Mahābala speaks of a “flaccid mind” and a “strong mind”? The former which is possessed by most common people “pants” (or gasps or hankers) very much, and prevents them from successfully attaining to the Tathāgata-dhyāna, while the “strong mind” is characteristic of one who can enter upon the realm of reality (bhūtakoṭi). As long as there are “pantings” (or gaspings) in the mind, it is not free, it is not liberated, and cannot identify itself with the suchness of reason. The mind must be “strong” or firm and steady, self-possessed and concentrating, before it is ready for the realisation of Tathāgata-dhyāna—a dhyana going far beyond the reach of the so-called four dhyānas and eight samādhis.

f88 This subject was treated in another place, though rather sketchily, and will be further elaborated later in an independent essay.

f89 In this connection I wish to make some remarks against certain scholars who consider the philosophy of Śūnyatā to be really the foundation of Zen. Such scholars fail utterly to grasp the true purport of Zen which is first of all an experience and not at all a philosophy or dogma. Zen can never be built upon any set of metaphysical or psychological views; the latter may be advanced after the Zen experience has taken place, but never before. The philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā can never precede Zen, but must always follow it. Buddhist scholars like those at the time of Dharma are too apt to identify teaching and life, theory and experience, description and fact. When this confusion is allowed to grow, Zen Buddhism will cease to yield an intelligent and satisfactory interpretation. Without the fact of Enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree near the Nairañjanā, no Nāgārjunas could ever hope to write a single book on the Prajñā philosophy.

f90 As I stated before, there is a confusion between Dharma’s mien-pi habit of sitting and his doctrine of the pi-kuan meditation. The confusion dates quite early, and even at the time of the author of the Records the original meaning of pi-kuan, wall-contemplation, must have been lost.

f91 Sometimes this man is said to be a civilian and sometimes a soldier embracing Confucianism.