The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya...

As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.

And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.

Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.—'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.—And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bhâ.

Samsargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gunânâm samsrishtânekavastuprakritikatvaprasaktir ity arthah. Ân. Gi.

For they limit one another.

To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).

The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.—Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd ity âha, pravrittîti. Anumânasiddhasya ketanasya na pravrittyâsrayateti darsayitum evakârah. Katham anumânam ity apekshâyâm tatprakâram; sûkayati kevaleti. Vailakshanyam prânâdimattvam. Ân. Gi.

Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.—Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatvam sâdhyavati pakshe pravishtatvam eva tak ka sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy upalakshanam, anpanyâso na vyabhikârabhûmin ity arthah. Ân. Gi.

It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.

Anâdheyâtisayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâtisaya sûnyasyety arthah. Ân. Gi.

For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims—ex hypothesi—only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.

I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.

Tritîyes'pi katipayasabdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva muktih syâd iti manvâno dvitîyam pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.

The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit samsârânukkhedât; the Bhâmatî's reading is: Sargasaktyanukkhedavad driksaktyanukkhedât.

On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.

Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyogah. Ân. Gi.

In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.

Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.

Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.

In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.

'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.

In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.

In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.

And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.

So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.

Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti sa@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.

For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.

The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.

Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.

For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sâ@nkhya also—release depends.

This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.

I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.

Parimandala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vis. Sût. VII, 1, 20.

Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.

When the time for a new creation has come.

The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.

The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the adrishta and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.

I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).

In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental Vaiseshika principle.

I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.