SOPHIST (continued 1)
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Plato and Jowett, Benjamin
THEAETETUS: To what do you refer?
STRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.
THEAETETUS: They certainly would not.
STRANGER: But they are willing.
THEAETETUS: Yes, they are.
STRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And they dispute about all things?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.
THEAETETUS: Impossible, of course.
STRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth?
THEAETETUS: Exactly; no better description of him could be given.
STRANGER: Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.
THEAETETUS: What is it?
STRANGER: I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
THEAETETUS: All things?
STRANGER: I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'
THEAETETUS: No, I do not.
STRANGER: Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.
THEAETETUS: What do you mean?
STRANGER: Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
THEAETETUS: What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman;—for you said that he is a maker of animals.
STRANGER: Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.
THEAETETUS: That must be a jest.
STRANGER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
STRANGER: We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?
THEAETETUS: Yes; why should there not be another such art?
STRANGER: But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?
THEAETETUS: That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
STRANGER: And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?
THEAETETUS: But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children's play?
STRANGER: Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.