Moral theology

1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a) extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help the many rather than the one.

1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places. (b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep him away from bad company.

1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety for the safety of the public.

(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person, for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life for the sake of a friend.

1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows: (a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and hence more deserving of love—for example, a saintly acquaintance may be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage, friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect (i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship, gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8). Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as visits) should be given.

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner, director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than his relatives who belong to another congregation.

(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military, religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious, etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer, and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not to his parents.

1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship, should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution), if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity, one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a) objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b) subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given are not guilty of serious sin.

1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14), third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country, all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one receives life from parents.

1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b) Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more, objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But, subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

1183. The Acts of Charity.—The principal act of the virtue of charity is love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus, benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is intimate and lasting, from its nature.

1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.—(a) From benevolence proceed gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him (Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23). (b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty, but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains to God.

1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal Source.

1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: “Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls” (I Pet., i. 9); but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to avoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.

1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary, tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its love.

1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the creature’s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b) It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves everything that pertains to God—each of the Divine Persons, all of the divine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth, charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): “Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart” (Deut., vi. 5).

1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De diligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured, but is the measure of all things.

(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to give more to strangers than to one’s needy parents, for this act would not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time and place.

1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered, is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the friend on account of natural affection: “If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?” (Matt, v. 46).

1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self. Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than the love of God.