FOOTNOTES
Project Gutenberg EPUB3 edition
Arnold, Edward Vernon
Source notes
[1] ‘[veteres illi Platonis auditores] totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt; quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus’ Cic. Fin. iv 2, 4.
[2] Sext. math. vii 16 (Arnim ii 38).
[3] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἄντικρυς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀπεφαίνοντο Philopon. ad Anal. pr. f. 4a; Stein, Psychologie ii 93. See also Arnim ii 49 and 49a.
[4] Epict. Disc. i 17, 6.
[5] Diog. L. vii 40.
[6] ἀρέσκει οὖν [τοῖς Κυνικοῖς] τὸν λογικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν ... καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι Diog. L. vi 103 and 105.
[7] τίς οὖν ὕλη τοῦ φιλοσόφου; μὴ τρίβων; οὔ, ἀλλὰ ὁ λόγος· τί τέλος; μή τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὔ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ἔχειν τὸν λόγον Epict. Disc. iv 8, 12.
[8] ‘Stoici ... cum vehementer amaverint artem disputandi’ Aug. Civ. De. viii 7.
[9] Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 66.
[10] See below, §§ 164, 165.
[11] ‘hi, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi ... totam vitam evertunt funditus’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 31.
[12] See above, § 93.
[13] Epict. Disc. ii 11, 13.
[14] ‘Stoici deum visum vocantes, quod optimum putabant’ Chalc. in Tim. 266 (Arnim ii 863).
[15] Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[16] Arnim ii 458.
[17] ‘mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea, quibus movetur’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. On the other hand the Epicureans treat the senses as bodily, and sensation as automatic.
[18] αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τό τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις ... καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται Diog. L. vii 52.
[19] Cleanthes called it ‘imprint’ (τύπωσις); Chrysippus, lest the word imprint should be interpreted too mechanically, called it ‘alteration’ (ἀλλοίωσις) Sext. math. vii 227, 372 (Arnim ii 56); ‘visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem’ Cic. de Fato 19, 43.
[20] Sext. math. vii 424 (Arnim ii 68); ‘ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et sani sunt ac valentes, et omnia removentur quae obstant et impediunt’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[21] ‘idem fit in vocibus, in odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis iudicium requirat acrius’ ib.
[22] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς Aët. plac. iv 9, 4; ‘[sensuum] clara iudicia et certa sunt’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 19.
[23] ‘sequuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: “illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.” animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non sensibus’ ib. 7, 21.
[24] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀληθεῖς, τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς Aët. plac. iv 9, 4 (Arnim ii 78); ‘Zeno nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia [dixit]’ Cic. N. D. i 25, 70.
[25] φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός· ... καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς αὑτὸ δείκνυσι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενα, καὶ ἡ φαντασία δείκνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς αὐτήν Aët. plac. iv 12, 1 (Arnim ii 54). The object which causes the φαντασία is technically called the φανταστόν, but also ὑπάρχον Sext. math. vii 426.
[26] διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς Aëtius plac. iv 12, 4.
[27]ib. 12, 5.
[28] φάντασμα μὲν γάρ ἐστι δόκησις διανοίας, οἵα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους Diog. L. vii 50.
[29] ‘visis [Zeno] non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41; cf. § 105.
[30] On this point the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno hinged; see above, § 84.
[31] ‘necesse est animum perspicuis cedere’ Cic. Ac. ii 12, 38.
[32] ‘perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam habet vim ut ipsa per sese ea quae sint nobis, ita ut sunt, indicet’ ib. 14, 45.
[33] ‘adsensio nostra erit in potestate’ Cic. Fat. 19, 43; ‘adsensio non [potest] fieri nisi commota viso; tamen id visum proximam causam [habet], non principalem’ ib. 18, 42; ‘[Zeno] adsensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 40.
[34] διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσον, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ Stob. ii 7, 11 m (Pearson, Z. fr. 15): cf. Plut. Sto. rep. 47, 10.
[35] ‘opinationem autem volunt esse imbecillam adsensionem’ Cic. Tusc. disp. iv 7, 15; ‘opinio quae [est] imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41; so Sext. math. vii 151 (Arnim ii 90).
[36] Epict. Disc. i 21, 2.
[37]ib. i 18, 1; Sext. math. vii 416.
[38] ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν Nem. nat. hom. vii p. 175 M (Stein, Psych. ii 135).
[39] Cicero’s point of view appears to be that the mind-picture grasps the object: ‘[visum] cum acceptum iam et adprobatum esset, [Zeno] comprehensionem appellabat, similem eis rebus quae manu prehenderentur’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 41. See further Stein, Psych. ii 174, and R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 71.
[40] This view is expressed by Posidonius, who bases it on Plato’s Timaeus: ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτως ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου Sext. Emp. math. vii 93. See also below, § 266.