The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being is a whole.

From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is present with a greater number of things; since to be is present with parts, so far as they are parts. But the other, viz. wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been demonstrated.