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[41] ‘comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur; non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret’ Cic. Ac. i 11, 42.

[42] Diog. L. vii 51; ‘quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus!’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 20.

[43] μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν Sext. math. vii 373 (Arnim i 64); ‘[mens] alia visa sic arripit, ut his statim utatur; alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30.

[44] ‘quicquid frequens cogitatio exercet et renovat, memoriae nunquam subducitur; quae nihil perdit, nisi ad quod non saepe respexit’ Sen. Ben. iii 2, 3.

[45] So substantially Chrysippus argued. See Sext. math. vii 231.

[46] ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν Aët. plac. iv 11, 2.

[47] Diog. L. vii 52.

[48] The details of this list are variously given: e.g. ‘cum rerum notiones in animo fiant, si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit, aut coniunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 33.

[49] Diog. L. vii 52.

[50] ‘homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras; facile totius vitae cursum videt’ Cic. Off. i 4, 11.

[51] So Zeller, Stoics etc., p. 79.

[52] ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ χάρτην· εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται Aët. plac. iv 11, 1. The metaphor of the tabula rasa can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, but in this application was first used by Cleanthes. Locke presumably borrowed it from the Stoics. It must not be thought that this metaphor implies passivity on the part of the soul; as the Stoics use it, the soul is from the beginning actively cooperating in obtaining impressions. See Stein, Psych. ii pp. 112 sqq., note 230.

[53] τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν ... οὐκ αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, καθάπερ αἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων Diog. L. vii 51.

[54] οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ἰδέας ἔφασαν Aët. plac. i 10, 5 (Arnim i 65); cf. Diog. L. vii 61.

[55] πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως Sext. math. viii 56 (Arnim ii 88); cf. Diog. L. vii 52 and 53.

[56] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30.

[57] Cic. N. D. i 17, 44.

[58] ἔστι δ’ ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54; ‘notionem appello quam Graeci tum ἔννοιαν tum πρόληψιν; ea est insita et praecepta cuiusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens’ Cic. Top. 7, 31; ‘nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest’ Ac. ii 7, 21. See also Aët. plac. iv 11, 3. If the concept can only be reached by special training, it must not be called πρόληψις.

[59] ‘There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named common sense (κοινὸς νοῦς)’ Epict. Disc. iii 6, 8. See also below, § 158.

[60] ‘We need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of what is reasonable or unreasonable to the several things conformably with nature’ Epict. Disc. i 2, 6.

[61] See Cic. Top. above, note 58.

[62] Diog. L. x 33.

[63] ‘cetera autem similitudinibus [mens] constituit; ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum ἐννοίας tum προλήψεις vocant’ Cic. Ac. ii 10, 30. As to the possibility of distinguishing the two terms see Prof. Reid’s note.

[64] See notes to the next section.

[65] ‘rerum plurimarum obscuras necessarias intelligentias enudavit [qu. incohavit?], quasi fundamenta quaedam scientiae’ Cic. Leg. i 9, 26; ‘quae in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, incohatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur’ ib. i 10, 30; ‘As to good and evil, beautiful and ugly ... and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them?’ Epict. Disc. ii 11, 3.

[66] ὁ δὲ λόγος ... ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἑβδομάδα Aët. plac. iv 11, 4; περὶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑβδομάδα ἔννοια γίνεται καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ ib. v 23, 1.

[67] ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται ... λόγῳ τῶν δι’ ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους Diog. L. vii 52; ‘collatione rationis boni notio facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quae sunt secundum naturam, ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 33; ‘nobis videtur observatio collegisse et rerum saepe factarum inter se collatio: per analogian nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum iudicant. noveramus corporis sanitatem; ex hac cogitavimus esse aliquam et animi. noveramus corporis vires; ex his collegimus esse et animi robur’ Sen. Ep. 120, 4; ‘de bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. non potest ferre sententiam, nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum’ ib. 66, 35.

[68] φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν Diog. L. vii 53.

[69] For the classification as a sensation see above, § 146.

[70] οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τήνδε (sc. Aristotelis) τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν ‘ἐντὸς ἁφὴν’ προσαγορεύουσι, καθ’ ἣν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα Aët. plac. iv 8, 7; ‘quid de tactu, et eo quidem quem philosophi interiorem vocant aut doloris aut voluptatis?’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 20. This feeling, if mistaken for the perception of an external object, is an ‘empty twitching’: φαντασία τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν· ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἑλκυσμὸς παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλεῖται Sext. math. vii 241 (Arnim ii 64). See further Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, p. 110.

[71] ‘visa quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea quae in somnis videantur, quaeque oraculis auspiciis extis declarentur’ Cic. Ac. ii 15, 47.

[72] Arnim ii 93 and 95; ‘ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?’ Cic. Ac. ii 7, 22; ‘ex quibus [perceptis] collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus, partim ad usum vitae, partim ad oblectationem necessariis’ N. D. ii 59, 148.

[73] Arnim ii 95.

[74] πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται Epict. Disc. i 22, 1.

[75] εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τοιούτων Stob. ii 7, 5 l (see also Wachsmuth’s crit. note).

[76] ‘scientiam ... quam nos non comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque atque immutabilem esse censemus’ Cic. Ac. ii 8, 23; ‘quod erat sensu comprehensum ... si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset, scientiam [Zeno] nominabat’ ib. i 11, 41; ‘quamcunque vero sententiam probaverit [sapiens], eam sic animo comprensam habebit, ut ea quae sensibus’ ib. ii 37, 119.

[77] See above, § 77.

[78] Plut. comm. not. 47, 4.

[79] Sext. math. vii 151 (Arnim ii 90); ‘scientiam, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem’ Cic. Ac. ii 47, 145.

[80] Diog. L. vii 54, as in note 84 below.