The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself,[207] but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i.e. to the good], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to the good itself [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed through participating of the good, and because it is not primarily the good. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.