The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For that which is imparticipable having the relation of a monad, as subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either[221] it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to a certain thing by which it is participated,[222] is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable.