The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness to extend itself to every thing which is able to participate of it. And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings.