The Six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, Volume 2

For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either[301] therefore, it is imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in multitude analogous to the one. Hence, there will be a certain intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not participate[302]] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant from the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a divine intellect,[303]] and an intellect which is intellectual only; the latter indeed, being established according to an intellectual peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad.